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The US Intelligence Community has shown a lack of understanding and appreciation of 
counterintelligence and its capabilities as a strategic tool.  Historically, US adversaries have 
used the famed Double-Cross System to engage in counterintelligence and counter-
espionage operations that have effectively neutralized US foreign intelligence operations.   
This research reviews and answers the question of “Strategic Counterintelligence; What Is It 
and What Should We Do About it?”1  Strategic counterintelligence is the analysis of foreign 
intelligence or security service entity acting on behalf of state or non-state actor.   The 
operational aspect is aimed at exploiting the state or non-state actor’s clandestine collection 
channel to manage the actor’s objectives.  My deception research revealed that state and 
non-state actors are still susceptible to deception, and that technology is increasing this 
vulnerability in the US.   Through researched historical examples, it was found that strategic 
counterintelligence operations are a method of imposing costs on a state or non-state actor, 
specifically through the controlled release of technology.  Lastly, Double-Cross-like 
operations are viable in cyberspace through the use of decoy and real network systems.  The 
US has the ability to effectively employ strategic counterintelligence operations, deliberately 
and reactively, against a state or non-state actor, to drive the actor’s moves and 
countermoves.      
Thesis Advisor: Dr. Mark Stout 
  
                                                        
1 Michelle K. Van Cleave, “Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and What Should We Do About It?” 
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Strategic Counterintelligence- Analysis conducted for policy makers of the state, non-state actors, 
and security and operational intelligence gathering entities. The analysis is completed 
through the collection of information via human, technical, and disruption activities.  The 
primary means of information collection is through counterintelligence and counter-
espionage operations.    
Strategic Counterintelligence Operations- Strategic counterintelligence is employed to identify the 
adversary/competitor’s clandestine human, technical, informational networks, and deny 
access to actual information of value. Through that denial, the goal is to influence the 
adversary’s intelligence collection feeding that adversary’s responsible leadership.  The 
influence and management may include the controlled release of manipulated 
information/data for the purposes of: 
 Exploiting the adversary/competitor’s view of the US national security goals and 
objectives. 
 Preventing US national security interests from being compromised through 
clandestine intelligence operations in progress and manage the value of the 
adversaries’ operations.   
 Enabling and assisting future clandestine intelligence operations planning and 
objectives through domestic and external US counter-espionage operations.  
 Reducing the potential advantages an adversary can exploit or develop through the 
active engagement in double-cross-like activities meant to deceive and impose a cost 
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on the adversary who attempts to illegally subvert or transfer US National Security 
information, technology, and capabilities.    
Counterintelligence (CI)- the art of the identification of foreign agents and officers operating on 
behalf of an allied or hostile operational intelligence service outside of the US.  The objective 
of the identification could be passive monitoring, recruitment, and compromise, or the 
disruption of their service’s operational objectives. 
Counter-Espionage (CE) - the art of identifying foreign agents operating against the state for an 
allied or adversary intelligence service.  The objectives could include passive monitoring, 
recruitment, and compromising or disrupting their service’s operational objectives.2    
Offensive Counterintelligence Operations- Clandestine activity conducted for military, strategic (for 
DoD), or national counterintelligence and security purposes against a target having 
suspected or known affiliations with foreign intelligence entities, international terrorism, or 
other foreign persons or organizations. The goal is to counter terrorism, espionage, or other 
clandestine activities that threaten the security of the United States.3 
Deception- The actions executed to mislead adversary military, state, non-state decision makers 
as to the initiator of the deception.  This may be initiated to protect a state or non-state 
political, diplomatic, military, and economic capabilities, intentions, and operations.4   
Hybrid Warfare- incorporates a range of modes of warfare, including conventional 
capabilities, irregular tactics and formations, terrorist acts (including indiscriminate violence 
and coercion), and criminal disorder.5 
                                                        
2 Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009). 
3 US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: 
U.S. Departent of State, Joint Publication 1-02, April 12, 2001,  As Amended Through April 2010.   
4 United States of America. Department of Defense. Joint Staff. Joint Publication 3-58: Joint Doctrine for Military 
Deception. Compiled by Joint Staff Publication. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. 
5 Frank G. Hoffman, Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars (Arlington, VA: 
Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, 2007). 
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Hybrid Challenger- a state or non-state group that employs hybrid warfare.   
Target Management- the active manipulation, influence, and handling of the threat through 
means traditionally associated with deception.    
National Security Interests- the foundation for the development of valid national objectives that 
define US goals or purposes. These national security interests include: preserving the US 
political identity, framework, and institutions; fostering economic well-being; and bolstering 
international order supporting the vital interests of the United States and its allies.6   
Cost Imposition Strategies- focus on eliciting an adversary response that creates a hardship  
 
differential favoring the initiating nation.7   
 
Left-of-Boom- in terms of strategic counterintelligence, the suggested policy prescription  
 
for strategic counterintelligence operations, and places an emphasis on penetration of state  
 
or non-state actor intelligence entities before they can initiate clandestine intelligence  
 
operations against, manage the actors intelligence entity objectives, and drive their  
 
moves/counter-moves.   
 
Cyberspace- first and foremost an informational environment, made up of digitized data  
 
that is created, stored, and most importantly, shared.8 
 
                                                        
6 US Department of Defense, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: 
US Department of State, Joint Publication 1-02, April 12, 2001, As Amended through 31 August 2005.  
7 Col. Kenneth P. Ekman, “Applying Cost Imposition Strategies against China,” Strategic Studies Quarterly, 
9(Spring 2015) 
8 Peter W. Singer and Allan Friedman, Cybersecurity and Cyberwar, What Everyone Needs to Know (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2014) 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION-FONS ET ORIGO 
 
“Although the purpose of counterintelligence is defensive, its methods are 
 essentially offensive”9  
- Allan Dulles 
Introduction of Thesis Concept 
 
This thesis tests the concept of strategic counterintelligence using qualitative 
research. It focuses on the use of historical cases that articulate how and why 
counterintelligence (CI) is a strategic tool that has been incorporated in order to serve US 
national security interests.  US national security interests are defined within the context of 
defense, economic, foreign, and political objectives.   
Three of the primary challenges that any researcher faces when it comes to 
counterintelligence include the lack of literature, the lack of consistent doctrines, and the fact 
that almost every entity in the US government conducts CI differently.  As Sherman Kent 
once complained in the 1950s, without definitive literature and studies on the practice of CI, 
“its fundamental theory runs the risk of never reaching full maturity.”10  This warning 
continues to be echoed by researchers into the present day.  American CI literature primarily 
centers around three principal entities as origins of US CI: James Angleton at the CIA; J. 
Edgar Hoover and the FBI’s interpretation of CI; and the British Counterespionage (CE) 
history (double-cross system).11121314  
                                                        
9 Allen Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of Intelligence 
Gathering for a Free World (Guilford, Connecticut: Lyons Press, 2016) 
10 Sherman Kent,  “The Need for an Intelligence Literature,” Studies in Intelligence (September 1955),3. 
11Holzman, Michael Howard. James Jesus Angleton, the CIA, and the craft of counterintelligence. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press, 2008. 
12 THE JOURNAL OF INTELLIGENCE HISTORY, November 2003, 21-49. Accessed January 01, 2016. 
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the.../JIH-Angleton-Robarge-2003.pdf. 
13 Batvinis, Raymond J. Origins of fbi counterintelligence. Lawrence: University Pr Of Kansas, 2009 




Without fully understanding the history of CI and CE, there is plenty of room for 
misinterpretations.  In short, in order to understand CI, especially in terms of any strategic 
relevance, one must understand that it is a blend of disciplines, employed to offset an activity 
initiated by state or non-state actors.  The initiator of the activities could have a number of 
goals, including theft, sabotage, or inflicting surprise through various designs to minimize the 
US’s military, economic, and political capabilities.  CI/CE is protective in nature, but 
through its protective/preventative operations, it exerts the ability to shift, shape, and 
influence a state or non-state actor.   
The US cannot afford to continue thinking that its economic and military might will 
always give its adversaries pause. The world is now multi-polar, and violent, non-state actors 
have adopted a hybrid approach to warfare that challenges US hegemony. New state actors 
have now engaged the US through multiple media in a manner that directly challenges its 
ability to project its power in the cyber environment.   
The Current and Future Security Environment 
 
With the global security environment becoming more dynamic and unstable, the 
ongoing evolution of established international relations systems, and the emergence of a 
multi-polar system, new powers will rise and old forces may fall.  The operational aspects 
highlighted through the historical test cases put forth by this body of research have direct 
relevance to countering the threats emerging from current and future violent non-state/state 
actors opposing the US. The current and future threat landscape has given rise to these three 
trends: 
 Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) are engaging in offensive and defensive 




  VNSAs and Violent State Actors (VSAs) are adopting hybrid warfare as a military 
strategy.  This poses a direct threat to the US and will challenge the US Intelligence 
Community, which is responsible for providing indications and warnings.  
 VSAs that engage in cyber-espionage challenge the US’s economic security. As a 
result, the US needs a cost imposition strategy to ensure its economic security and 
deter VNSAs and VSAs from engaging in cyber-espionage activities and/or exploit 
the aggressors’ cyber activities.   
Accurate and uninfluenced information will be critical to understanding how these new 
trends and actors will challenge the US and put American interests at risk.  Strategic 
counterintelligence has the potential to deliver an impact by manipulating and imposing a 
cost to the target, thus remaining faithful to its origins as discovered through the British 
Double-Cross System.  One of the ripple effects of the operational design of the British 
Double-Cross System was the penetration of the German intelligence clandestine network: 
the double agents were in receipt of the shopping lists of essential elements of information 
needed for Nazi military planning.   The British managed the double agents and gave them 
information to assist in Nazi military planning, to the British’s benefit.   
The literature reviews conducted for each chapter focus on specific case studies that 
highlight the essence of strategic counterintelligence as understood in this thesis.  Through 
the use of these case studies, which were initiated by various state and non-state actors, we 
see the success of these operations, ultimately disrupting the target’s ability to collect 
information either overtly or clandestinely.  Oftentimes, the evidence from the case studies 
presents strong indications of ripple effects that compounded and sometimes exposed the 
targets to other overt or clandestine operational elements in their attempts to engage in 
espionage against the initiator. Through this text, we will see that the global security 
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environment is constantly challenging the possibility that a state like the United States will be 
able to employ a system-based approach relying on whole Intelligence Community discipline 
approaches to counter state or non-state actors. For this reason, research in this field is all 
the more critical.   
Fons Et Origo of US Counterintelligence and Counter-Espionage 
 “Do not forget that a traitor within our ranks, known to us, can do more harm to the enemy than a loyal 
man can do good to us.”15 
-Isaac Asimov 
 
In 1937, the British clandestine MI-5 domestic security service employed the Double 
Cross-System to counter German intelligence services’ hidden network of agents. MI-6, the 
British foreign intelligence service, also played a crucial role in the Double Cross-System, 
running double agents under its counterintelligence mission.  This occurred just as Germany 
was collecting and preparing for sabotage operations within Britain. The result of these 
operations helped persuade the Allied chiefs to approve the largest known deception 
operation in the history of the world.16  The double-cross system’s goal was to manipulate 
and provide alternative and plausible information to the German military and its leadership, 
which amplified Allied military plans and ultimately ensured the success of Operation 
Neptune (D-Day).17   The most complex, sensitive, and detailed CE operation aimed to 
essentially blind the Nazi intelligence apparatus, the Abwehr, and prevent Hitler from 
receiving any information that allowed his military force to have warning of allied activities.    
 However, MI-5 and MI-6 were not the only professional service organization 
engaging in CE operations and deceiving the Nazis. In 1943, the Office of Strategic Services 
(OSS), the forerunner to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), created a CI division, known 
                                                        
15 Isaac Asimov, Pebble in the Sky (New York, Doubleday, 1950), 70. 





as X-2.1819 The role of X-2 was to learn the art of employing the double-cross system and 
running the double agent from MI-5 and MI-6.  As the initial OSS officers learned from 
their British colleagues, this technique was successful not merely due to running double 
agent operations, but also the secret ability of the British to intercept, decrypt, and read the 
Abwehr’s communications.20  The program was named ULTRA,21 and was highly classified; 
dedicated to breaking the German Enigma machine.22  The ULTRA program would 
intercept messages and decrypt them so that they could be used to identify Abwehr 
clandestine agent networks operating within Great Britain and overseas.  MI-5’s cycle of 
operations included watching and studying the approaches of the Abwehr agents, who were 
presented with two options: continuing to spy for the Abwehr while taking direction from 
the MI-5; or being arrested for espionage.2324  The result was the blinding of the Abwehr’s 
intelligence apparatus, and as Masterman asserted, “We controlled the whole thing.”25 
Masterman was alluding to the control held by British intelligence and security services over 
all the information that the Abwehr clandestine agents were collecting.  The information 
provided to the agents was a mixture of real and false information. The double-cross system 
was responsible for providing guidance to the Nazi military and destabilizing the Nazis from 
within, ultimately leading Nazi leadership to put little to no faith in its intelligence services.26     
Despite their significance, the value and impact such operations had on the war 
effort had the potential of derailing ongoing Allied war activities. Due to the crucial nature 
of this mission, the X-2 became another intelligence service within the OSS intelligence 
                                                        
18 Robert Cowden, “OSS Double-Agent Operations in World War II,” Studies in Intelligence, 58 (2014) 
19 Dulles, The Craft of Intelligence 
20 ibid. 
21 Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5. 
22 ibid. 
23ibid. 
24 Cowden, “OSS Double-Agent Operations in World War II,” 68 
25 ibid. 
26 Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945. 
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service, which would have access to all OSS and British intelligence.  The British shared the 
crown jewels with the OSS: as noted in the declassified US government history of 
counterintelligence Services, “the United States was given the opportunity of acquiring, 
within a short period of time, extensive counterintelligence records representing the fruits of 
many decades of counterintelligence experience.”2728 The initial training for the X-2s was 
provided by MI-5 and MI-6, and included everything from approaching a potential agent, 
doubling that agent, handling the agent, and the purpose of running the double-cross.  As Sir 
John Masterman, the chief of the British double-cross system, briefed his OSS X-2 
colleagues in 1943, the double-cross program’s creed included the following: 
1. To control the enemy system, or as much of it as we could get our hands on. 
 
2. To catch fresh spies when they appeared. 
 
3. To gain knowledge of the personalities and methods of the German Secret Service. 
 
4. To obtain information about the code and cypher work of the German Service. 
 
5. To get evidence of the enemy plans and intentions through questions asked by them. 
 
6. To influence enemy plans by the answers sent by the enemy. 
 
7. To deceive the enemy about our own plans and intentions.29 
 
 As the knowledge transfer from the British security and intelligence services 
amassed, so did the desire for the OSS to initiate its own double-cross like system that would 
focus on identifying enemy agents operating within Allied territories.   A little known case 
involving one of the first US documented successful recruitments of a controlled agent 
handler was executed by the OSS X-2’s service.30   Working in conjunction with their British 
                                                        
27 US Office of Strategic Services, History of United States Counterintelligence, Vol. I, 32. (Records of the Office of 
Strategic Services, Record Group 226, Entry 117, Box 2, National Archives College Park (NACP), 1943), 34. 
28 Cowden, “OSS Double-Agent Operations in World War II” 
29 Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945, 58 
30 Cowden, “OSS Double-Agent Operations in World War II”, 68 
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colleagues, the X-2 identified a Spanish national living in France, who had been reporting to 
the Abwehr since 1935.  Drawing upon the training the X-2 learned from the British, the X-
2 officers observed the Spaniard and studied what information he was providing, consulted 
with military planners to determine how the Spaniard could be used, and then moved in for 
recruitment.   The pitch followed a tried and true method.  They knew the Spaniard enjoyed 
the freedom and life he had, so X-2 officers offered him a deal he couldn’t refuse: pass the 
information X-2 gave him through his wireless radio set, or face prison for treason.  The 
man was arrested and, given the above-mentioned choices, readily agreed to work with X-2. 
The result of this recruitment identified that the Abwehr was using the Spanish national, 
whose code name was DRAGOMAN.31  DRAGOMAN’s role was to report to the Abwehr 
on any ships, commando like units, or other heavy weapons.32   Once the first successful 
recruitment occurred, within a few months, the X-2 was able to recruit a few more Abwehr 
agents operating within France, all of whom were charged with reporting on Allied 
activities.33   
This network, now composed of X-2-controlled Abwehr agents, furthered the on-
going British double-cross system deception activities in support of Allied military actions.34  
Through the MI-5, MI-6, and X-2 counter-espionage operations, the Abwehr agents were 
effectively doubled in place, giving direct access to the Abwehr’s and Nazi military 
information needs.  
The X-2 was also getting great assistance from their British colleagues’ signals 
intelligence capabilities through the ULTRA program working to transcribe encrypted 
German intelligence messages.  The benefits of ULTRA intercepts for X-2 operations were 
                                                        
31 ibid. 68-70. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid, 70-71 
34 ibid. 72 
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twofold: ULTRA provided leads on the Abwehr agents already in place, which assisted X-2 
with targeting; and X-2 was then able to study the potential recruitment and characterize 
what they were communicating back to Germany.  The benefit of this activity ensured that 
streams of information were provided to the German intelligence service, causing no alarm 
or suspicion about the agent in place.  
This X-2 initiative particularly amplified Allied military operations in France.   The 
results of X-2’s France double-cross system operations allowed the allies to control Abwehr 
intelligence operations.   One of the byproducts of the information the Abwehr required 
included informational questionnaires, which allowed the Allies to have an intimate look and 
develop a deep understanding of their military strategy and capacities.  These operations 
opened the door to providing both truthful and non-truthful information, and the only way 
it could be validated was through other information sources.  Much like the British 
operations, upon the recruitment of one Abwehr agent, the rest soon became cooperative 
informants.  Within a matter of time, the network had been identified and was providing 
Allied-controlled information to the Abwehr.      
The DRAGOMAN case highlights the effectiveness of X-2’s ability when it came to 
running double agents, but also demonstrates the effectiveness of deceptive material being 
reported through clandestine sources.   However, as X-2 would learn, along with British 
security and intelligence services, a deception is only as good as its ability to support and 
manage the information.  This meant the Abwehr had to see physical proof of the 
information that was passed through the system.  Evidence that the false information was 
true further enhanced the credibility of the British and X-2 controlled agents.35  This was 
                                                        
35 ibid., 69  
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done by providing the Abwehr with manipulated bomb damage assessments of factories, 
military bases, and Allied logistical movements.36     
   The results of the double-cross system echo the themes of this research project. The 
system shows that CE operations are effective against adversarial intelligence services and 
the current security environment the US faces from human, technical and cyber threats are 
optimal for use to manage them to the US’s advantage.  Case studies were selected for the 
study that focused on US operations and adversarial operations.  Both US and adversary CE 
operations had two common objectives: preventing secrets from being compromised and 
enhancing a secret’s capability.  Both prevention of the compromise and enhancing the 
secret’s potential involve deception techniques.37   The secret can be a plan, technology, 
weapon capability, political interest, or operation; however, the CE operation’s effectiveness 
depends on the knowledge and requirements of the target.38    
The employment of the double-cross system was so effective because of the deep 
study and analysis of the Abwehr. This investigation was conducted by British intelligence 
and security services, and it allowed the MI-5 and MI-6 officers to work quickly and know 
what information would be passed through their double agents.  The information was 
relevant to the Nazi military strategy, and the deceptive uses of the agents were coordinated 
with other Allied efforts.3940    
Through the placement and access of a double agent, a great wealth of intelligence 
information was obtained on the target.  Such intelligence included tradecraft, clandestine 
infrastructure, and penetrations within the initiating service, covert communication methods, 
                                                        
36 Masterman, The Double-Cross System in the War of 1939 to 1945. 
37 ibid. 
38 ibid. 
39 Andrew, Defend the Realm 
40 “Cowden, OSS Double-Agent Operations in World War II” 
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valuable political information, adversary military capabilities, and military industrial 
capabilities.  As history has shown, this happens to be one of the most effective espionage 
operations, and it should be run more frequently, particularly with the current threat 
portfolio that we face in the United States. 
Review of Contemporary Counterintelligence and Counter-Espionage Literature 
 
“The purpose is not just to manipulate or frustrate the opponent’s intelligence operations, but to capitalize on 
what he is not doing well or is not doing at all.”41 
-Jennifer E.Sims 
vs. 
“The real test of successful counterespionage, and that is our task, is locating the spy, ascertaining his contacts 
and methods of communication-and then closing off his sources of information.”42 
-J.Edgar Hoover 
 
Americans have traditionally focused on CI as an investigation that aims to identify 
and arrest a spy.  This is rooted in the foundations of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
Foreign Counterintelligence Program.  Unfortunately, the arrest of a spy is not a success, but 
rather a conclusion of a process emphasizing a failure on the part of the victim’s intelligence 
or security service.  The FBI’s CI program is defined and focused on four goals: 
Protect the secrets of the U.S. Intelligence Community, using intelligence to focus 
investigative efforts, and collaborating with out government partners to reduce the 
risk of espionage and insider threats, Protect the nation’s critical assets, like our 
advanced technologies, and sensitive information in defense, intelligence, economic, 
financial, public health, and science and technology sectors, Counter the activities of 
foreign spies, through proactive investigations, the Bureau identifies who they are 
and stops what they are doing. Keep weapons of mass destruction from falling into 
the wrong hands, and use intelligence to drive FBI investigative efforts to keep 
threats from becoming reality.  43 
 
                                                        
41 Jennifer E. Sims, "Twenty-First-Century Counterintelligence: The Theoretical Basis for Reform," In Vaults, 
Mirrors, and Masks: Rediscovering U.S. Counterintelligence, eds. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber 
(Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008) 
42 Hoover, "Is There a Spy Menace?" 





The US Central Intelligence Agency defines CI as “Information gathered, and 
activities conducted to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or 
assassinations conducted by or on behalf of foreign governments or elements thereof, 
foreign governments or elements thereof, foreign organizations, or foreign persons or 
international terrorist activities.”44 
The British foreign and domestic security MI-6 and MI-5 largely view CI and CE as 
being one and the same, with the point of departure being that CI is conducted by the 
British foreign intelligence service, while CE is conducted by a security service.  The British 
defines of CI and CE in terms with areas of responsibility.   MI-5 operates domestically; it is 
the security service countering espionage conducted by foreign espionage networks within 
domestic realm.   MI-6 operating in the overseas realm conducts CI because its mission is to 
collect information outside of its home country. 45       
Strategic counterintelligence operations (SCIOs) are an operational activity, an 
analytical process, and delivery system that can offset the target’s strengths and protect 
nations’ most vital secrets.  Through numerous historically documented double-cross-like 
operations, one of the potential effects of these operations is the uncovering of clandestinely 
recruited agents who are working on behalf of foreign powers and can then be manipulated.  
The ultimate goal of CE is to identify and detect a foreign power or group’s clandestine 
intelligence operations, and to control them in order to neutralize any threats.  
The scope of this literature review is narrowed to research that attempts to define 
what, if any, strategic role CI can play. It also examines the efforts, including theory, to 
define what US CI strategy should be.  To explore the origins of this topic, one must first 
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understand what CI is and what it is not.   Research provided by Christopher Andrew in 
Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI-5 (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2009), and by 
Allan Dulles in The Craft of Intelligence: America's Legendary Spy Master on the Fundamentals of 
Intelligence Gathering for a Free World, (Guilford, Connecticut: Lyons Press, 2016) serve as the 
foundations and lineage of the US CI system.46   
Additionally, four contemporary researchers have also conducted serious research 
into the topic of CI: Michelle Van Cleave, the former National Counterintelligence 
Executive (NCIX) director; John Ehrman; Jennifer Sims; and Burton Gerber. Their research, 
however, was based on pursuing a strategic target with competing state interests, such as 
military technology or strategy, and fails to even address the issue of non-state threats, much 
less place them in focus. As seen below, the only researcher who really attempts to define 
what US strategic counterintelligence should be is Van Cleave.47  Van Cleave puts forth the 
argument that strategic counterintelligence is a valuable tool that targets a strategic target 
through the use of foreign intelligence interests, which is our research and development 
laboratories, cleared defense contractors, and academic institutions.  This is a reversal of 
sorts, inviting the adversary to dinner of sorts, and feeding the adversary what they wanted 
to eat per-say.48   
At the onset of this research, a fundamental question was raised: what is strategic 
counterintelligence?  Several researchers have attempted to answer what the US should be 
doing in counterintelligence, and a few answers have emerged.  These researchers have a 
common baseline of what American CI is and what it should be: the manner in which the 
US currently practices CI is flawed; a deep understanding of the adversary requires extensive 
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analysis; and that analysis should be used to penetrate the inner circle of a state or non-state 
intelligence entity and shape what the target knows or does not know.49505152  Sims and 
Gerber have taken a multi-opinioned approach from selected researchers in the disciplines 
of CI and foreign intelligence collection.53  These researchers agree that counterintelligence is 
offensive, and the fight against the adversary must be made through expansive global 
operations.54 Sims and colleagues propose that counterintelligence should be adapted to the 
mission or objective that one is attempting to achieve,55 which some have argued requires 
the incorporation of additional theory.56  Their conclusions point to a strong need for 
solutions.  
Van Cleave’s Perspective 
In 2007, Michelle Van Cleave, the former National Counterintelligence Executive 
(NCIX) Director, published a piece titled “Strategic Counterintelligence: What Is It and 
What Should We Do about It?” In this article, Van Cleave argued that strategic 
counterintelligence is an underdeveloped concept that is even less understood than strategic 
intelligence.57  In her view, the “signature purpose of counterintelligence is to confront and 
engage the adversary.”58 Van Cleave attempted to operationalize the notion of strategic 
counterintelligence within a large conceptual strategic context, introducing the practice as an 
instrument of power. A significant aspect of her argument examines on strategic 
counterintelligence as “the potential for engaging CI collection and operations as tools to 
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advance national security policy objectives, and, at the strategic level, to go on the offense to 
degrade hostile external foreign intelligence services and their ability to work against us.”59  
Van Cleave is right: history has shown that such theoretical concepts can be 
executed.  The proof is found in the MI-5 and MI-6’s use of the double-cross system in 
World War Two.  Van Cleave reminds policy makers and readers that the US must accept 
three realities before strategic counterintelligence can be adopted: the threat the US faces 
from foreign intelligence services is strategic; strategic intelligence threats must be met by a 
strategic response; and a national level system must exist to integrate and coordinate 
activities.60  Van Cleave asserts that the clandestine service must to take the fight to the 
adversary, meaning that whoever is charged with this mission must engage the adversary 
offensively in their country and through foreign partners. However, her perspective 
concerns strategic counterintelligence in support of USIC activities and political activities, 
which is a very traditional focus that only touches on the protection of US research and 
development.      
Van Cleave’s work also indicates why CI is not successful as a whole.   From the US 
domestic perspective, traditional CI is approached in a manner that is case driven,61 This 
narrowness of perspective, she argues, reduces the strategic impact that the practice can have 
on an adversary.62  In Counterintelligence and National Strategy, Van Cleave dives deeper into this 
approach, reviewing US CI efforts since World War I and stressing the need for a more wide 
ranging approach employed throughout the US CI system, arguing that the “measures of 
effectiveness in counterintelligence-and in personal advancement in the profession have 
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been delimited by individual cases.”63 Van Cleave indicates that CI has been US CI is still 
very much focused on finding the spy, arresting the spy, and removing the threat through 
those means.  In Van Cleave’s eyes, its reluctance to delve into broader, non-governmental 
institutions is a major reason that the US does not meet the threat that is posed to our 
national security: “U.S. adversaries do not target an FBI field office, or a CIA station, or a 
military unit.”64  Our adversaries target banks, laboratories, defense contractors, academic 
institutions, and the reality is that our CI system is focused on addressing a particular 
problem and not addressing the whole. 
Sims and Colleagues 
After 9/11, the US government initiated one of the largest reviews of national 
security in history, and the 9/11 Commission discovered major vulnerabilities concerning 
the capacities of law enforcement and the intelligence community.   Much of the counter-
terrorism focus had been overseas; however, what was lost in all the bureaucratic reforms 
was the ineffectiveness of the US Domestic and Foreign CI program, which proved to be 
lacking.  American intelligence agencies generated leads from overseas about foreign citizens 
that were meant to participate in the “plane operation” who ended up entering the US.65  
The indications were visible, but were not understood.   No domestic CI service attempted 
to approach the hijackers, monitor them, or study them. According to Jennifer Sims, “the 
case of 9/11 reveals what can happen when intelligence and counterintelligence divorce: loss 
to a weaker enemy”.66  Sims expresses the importance of examining specifically how the US 
should effectively apply CI in order to capitalize on its strengths to exploit its competitors’ 
weaknesses, and how to persistently exploit their operations to create advantages for US 
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national security.  Ultimately, Sims says the “purpose is not to just manipulate or frustrate 
the opponent’s intelligence operations, but to capitalize on what he is not doing well or is 
not doing at all.”67  
In Transforming U.S. Intelligence,68 Jennifer Sims and Burton Gerber engaged several 
experts to write on various topics that are important for the transformation of the USIC.  
The most emergent theme of this volume is the need to overhaul or reform the USIC to 
support a new security environment that will be less stable and very dynamic. The 
researchers emphasize that the US has a dire need for warnings of emerging technology and 
emerging threats, as well as a new way of countering issues that will challenge elements of 
US national power.   Much like Van Cleave, the researchers have called for a serious look at 
how the current USIC views the world and how the US can transform its own system.    
John Gosler, a resident fellow at Sandia National Laboratories who authored the 
“Digital Dimension” chapter in the above-cited volume, reviewed the emergence of the 
cyber threat and how the social culture of the IC has had to evolve.69 He also examined the 
proliferation of cyber-attack capabilities that have now found their way into even poorly 
funded foreign intelligence services and non-state actors, which Hezbollah demonstrated 
during the 2006 conflict with Israel.  Gosler surmised that using technology as a spy or 
exploiting technology as a weakness can assist elements of US national power, or, more 
specifically, USIC capabilities to further intelligence collection, which could also be used for 
counterintelligence purposes.70  
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In June 2015, the Office of Personnel Management reported that its systems had 
been hacked by an unknown attacker.71  A month later, FBI Director James Comey 
confirmed that over 18 million government workers had been affected by the breach.72  In 
December of 2015, China then announced the hack was criminal and non-state sponsored, 
and that the hackers responsible for the attack had been arrested. 73   This incident illustrates 
how a hybrid challenger can utilize cyber-espionage operations for the purposes of CI.  The 
stolen files provided insight into the personal information of nearly 20 million government 
workers, including financial data, identities of family members, mental disabilities, health 
ailments, narcotics usage, and disciplinary information.  Such data represents a treasure trove 
for any intelligence entity aiming to recruit human sources that have access to the 
information that they need.  
Van Cleave and Gosler also emphasized the rise of non-traditional intelligence 
collection elements and the proliferation of clandestine and technical collection methods.  
For instance, there is evidence of non-state actors, including criminal, cyber, drug, and 
terrorist groups, employing counterintelligence apparatuses to monitor their own 
subsidiaries.  These groups have to balance such trade-offs in order to elude detection and 
avoid compromising their own members.  Blake Mobley’s dissertation, Terrorist Group 
Counterintelligence, assessed how terrorist groups avoid detection, neutralization, and enhances 
capabilities.  Mobley characterizes the process as an exercise in strategy:  
As in a game of chess, the majority of “moves” in the operational environment 
enhances some features of an organization’s counterintelligence posture while 
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weakening others.74Advanced technologies offer counterintelligence benefits but 
usher in new technological vulnerabilities. An increased attack tempo earns more 
popular support for a terrorist group, but also increases the group’s operational 
profile.  [Finally], group records enhance counterintelligence analysis, but also leave 
a paper trail of the organization’s most sensitive personnel and activities.75   
 
The goal for strategic CI operations should be to study these groups and apply game theory 
analysis, much like the work carried out by the Double-Cross committee in World War II.76  
Once the strategy is understood, the goal should be to force these non-state actors to make 
trade-offs that are beneficial to the exploitation or disruption of their activities.    
Sims declares that mission-based counterintelligence operations focus on countering 
an adversary’s intelligence service and exploiting its weaknesses.77  Sims makes many of the 
same points as Van Cleave, though in Sim’s view, such an activity both “targets operations 
before they take place and weaknesses before they are fixed”78 and  “emphasizes the 
offensive as it exploits gaps in the opponent’s intelligence system in order to set up its own 
side for winning moves.”79  Sims, like Van Cleave, views CI as an operational activity that 
produces intelligence that can be analyzed and capitalized upon.  The purpose of mission-
based CI operations, therefore, is to anticipate the moves of one’s adversaries and use one’s 
advantages to counter them.80 The principal difference between Sims’ strategy and previous 
CI approaches is the emphasis on the acknowledgement of this reality; it is not possible to 
protect every bit of classified information from an interested FIE, and one has to be willing 
and expect a loss.  Knowing that one uses adversary collection to engage the FIE, degrading 
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the FIE by providing carefully selected intelligence to the adversary and helping the FIE 
selectively will open opportunities for offensive operations. 81 
 John Ehrman emphasizes that our lack of understanding of CI is due to it being “a 
neglected area of study”, and his major goal is to move the US intelligence community 
towards a framework and theory of CI.82 The main foundation of Ehrman’s framework is a 
deep understanding and in-depth analysis of the adversary intelligence apparatus.  This 
requires several different components involving intelligence operations and analysis of those 
operations that result in successful policy options and effects from the policy that achieve 
US objectives.83  The strength of Ehrman’s approach is that “it places analysis at the center 
of counterintelligence work but also makes clear the need for multidisciplinary approach and 
integrates analytical with operational activities.”84 
By applying both Van Cleave’s and Sims’ ideas on CI, we reach the conclusion that 
counterintelligence is analytical, used to enhance the security of operations and protect 
secrets, but it has the ability to be proactive.  This is a break from the approach to traditional 
USIC strategic intelligence gathering operations. Much of US literature that references the 
topic of counterintelligence is focused on the traditional CIA approach, which is defensive 
operation employed to protect tradecraft, operations, and vetting of potential sources. Van 
Cleave and Sims advocate using the CI’s capabilities to enhance intelligence collection and 
shape adversaries’ own collections on US capabilities and intentions.   Shaping adversaries’ 
knowledge of US targets involves the use of deceptive information passed back to the 
adversary intelligence collection service for the purpose of exploiting how the adversary is 
working against you, such as determining whether they have made penetrations and 
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monitoring intelligence assets for arrest or compromising.   This benefits whatever mission 
or strategy the US is trying to execute.     
The results of the double-cross system have highlighted that CE operations also 
collect valuable intelligence information that can provide actionable information to identify 
other agent networks, adversary military capabilities, and valuable political information.   
Organization of Thesis and Key Findings 
Chapter 2 of this study, “Can Violent Non-State Actors be Deceived and Can States 
Deceive a Violent Non-State Actor Forcing the Target to Act Favorably to the Initiator?” 
explores whether SCIOs can be used to counter violent non-state actors (VNSA) engaging in 
hybrid warfare.  State actors employing counterespionage operations have proven to be 
effective at dismantling and disrupting operations initiated by the target from within. 
Drawing upon cases in other countries that have been engaged in CT operations and used 
double-cross-like operations focusing on VNSAs demonstrates that deliberate activities can 
destabilize them from within by deceiving and breeding mistrust between the target 
members.   
The flip side to that coin is that VNSAs can do the same to state actors.  The 
evidence does suggest that violent non-state actors are often very skilled at initiating 
counterespionage operations and using double agents, as the double agents frequently 
successfully deceive state intelligence services or entities with information and evidence used 
to illicit a response from the target that is favorable to the initiator.  Specifically, groups like 
Hezbollah and Al Qaeda have shown a great understanding and appreciation for SCIO like 
activities.  Hezbollah deserves the most attention in this area due to the scale of the 
deception it employed against Israel.   
21 
 
Both state and non-state actors incorporate great sophistication into their operations, 
with the use of technology to mask communications, premeditated action, and a deep 
understanding of their adversaries’ desires into their operations.  Chapter 3 of the thesis, 
“Employment of U.S. Controlled Technology Transfer to Aid U.S. Cost Imposition 
Strategies”, poses the following research question: can state-on-state SCIOs be an effective 
method for delivering cost imposition strategies to an adversary?  The discussion on costs 
will review Russian double-cross like operations initiated against the CIA to influence US 
defense investments, as well as similar US operations initiated against the KGB to influence 
USSR defense investments during the Cold War.  The examples will articulate how double-
cross operations can impose a cost on an adversary, particularly demonstrating that SCIOs 
can be effective against a state actor.  The research reveals that the US previously engaged in 
clandestine operations to counter Cold War adversaries attempting to acquire US restricted 
technologies, imposing a great cost upon the USSR.   Yet, in turn, the US has also been 
victim to state adversary CE operations that played a part in the Department of Defense 
making investments based on deceptive information fed by KGB controlled double-agents.85  
Chapter 4, titled “Double-Crossing the Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) 
through the Deception of the Advanced Persistent Threats (APT)”, assesses whether or not 
SCIOs are effective and feasible in cyberspace against APTs.  The relevance of this research 
is how it essentially outlines a framework to initiate SCIO’s through a cyber medium.  
Through the review of current decoy systems, cyber CI practices, and APT behaviors, the 
results find that the use of decoy systems is proven to work against sophisticated network 
attackers.  However, the APTs today look for specific target material.  To affect the APT 
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and the entity tasking the APT, tactically, decoy systems deceive the APT, while strategically, 
the target material has to be believable and contain enough feed to continually invite the 
APT to try again. With the use of other techniques, like using physical double agents, the 
likelihood of deceiving the actor increases drastically.  Additionally, the cyber environment 
strongly enhances the effectiveness of double cross operations.  
Chapter 5, titled “Strategic Counterintelligence Defined Through History”, concludes 
with a summary of the findings.  A predominant theme of the research is that there has not 
been sufficient exploration of U.S. economic elements in the use of SCIOs and the 
deliberate transfer of technology to VNSAs and VSAs for the purpose of exploitation and 
manipulation (except in “Operation Farewell”). The goal is to develop the essential elements 
needed for offensive and passive intelligence operations aimed at protecting US networks, 
illicit finances, and communications.  Some policy and framework suggestions are also 





CHAPTER 2: CAN VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS BE DECEIVED, AND CAN 
STATES DECEIVE A VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTOR? 
“All Warfare Is Based On Deception”86 
-Sun Tzu 
Introduction and Research Question 
Can states deceive VNSAs through double-cross like operations? Can VNSAs 
deceive state actors through double-cross like operations?  The evolution of VNSAs has 
shown existing states the importance these entities place on strategy.   Within the context of 
this research, the use of deception is viewed in a multifaceted manner, and not simply as a 
theory of “hoodwinking” one’s opponent.  History has shown that deception occurs 
regularly and is often times practiced more by US challengers.   However, this analysis will 
focus on states and whether it is possible to deceive a VNSA, and if a VNSA can deceive a 
state.   
Hypotheses: 
I offer two hypotheses for investigation in this chapter: 
H1 States can deceive VNSAs; and  
H2 VNSAs can deceive states.    
Review of the Literature 
 This literature review focuses on two main questions.   First, is there evidence of 
states deceiving VNSAs? Second, do VNSAs deceive states?   Literature searches identified 
the use of CI techniques employed by the British and Saudi states that employed deliberate 
and reactive double-agent operations to engage a VNSA and provide them with deceptive 
information for a strategic interest.   These interests, on behalf of both states, ranged from 
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reducing the risk a VNSA posed to the internal security of the state and building better 
capacity with partners.   
MI-5/FRU vs. PIRA 
“The trick is to not mind killing, and to expect dying.”87 
Kevin Fullton 
MI-5/FRU deceiving PIRA 
Reviewing the literature pertinent to CI operations launched against non-state actors, 
such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA), is essential to this research because 
the US and British also used the PIRA test cases for various military counterinsurgency and 
irregular warfare studies.  The rise of the PIRA was aided both by the local populace and the 
ineffective strategy employed by the United Kingdom, whose intelligence services were 
challenged early on in the conflict.88 However, PIRA’s CI focus was on supporting 
operational intelligence development and operational security measures to mask and hide 
operations,89 which was needed because PIRA had to maintain the credibility that it was an 
effective and powerful organization.90  CI methods employed by the United Kingdom’s 
Security Service MI-5 against PIRA, as a whole, emphasized recruiting and inserting a 
mixture of double agents and controlled sources to penetrate PIRA. Those penetrations 
would identify PIRA members for surveillance, allowing MI-5 (or later FRU) to disrupt and 
interrogate them.91  This strategy worked, though it was costly for both services.   PIRA 
challenged MI-5 and other UK intelligence elements in a manner that required a drastically 
different response than the methods previously used against the organization.  For the 
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intelligence service to be relevant during an insurgency, information had to be timely and 
relevant to the tactics employed at the time.92   
When analyzing the British security services operations aimed at PIRA, it became 
clear that PIRA played the same game against MI-5.  It is important to note that PIRA had 
studied British security service CE operations, so the organization was well aware of the 
sophisticated CE techniques that MI-5 would take in its attempts to counter PIRA 
operations.9394  This was a highly sophisticated and complex CE vs. CE campaign, which 
involved using deceptive information in an effort on both sides to ferret out informants and 
enhance military operations. Both PIRA and MI-5 aimed to destabilize and affect each other 
to establish dominance.95   Ilardi argued the basics of PIRA’s CI analysis of MI-5 and later 
FRU were formed from CE operations run against MI-5 using PIRA’s own developed 
double.96 Both MI-5 and PIRA relied on basic human intelligence collection within their 
areas of interest. PIRA focused on developing sources of information within their controlled 
territory and areas that were being prepared in forward areas of Great Britain outside their 
established safe areas.   MI-5 did the same thing, working the streets, developing sources of 
information through various military raids, and police activities.  These various sources of 
information were crucial into forming their respective CE operations, which appeared to 
focus on the disruption of each other’s intelligence gathering and military operations.97  
British government officials, intelligence historians, and journalists have cited several 
cases that highlighted the use of CE-like operations with a double-cross system activated 
with the goal of penetrating PIRA’s organization. The known successful penetrations were 
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of PIRA’s internal security and operational planning apparatus.   MI-5, was in the position to 
direct, manage, and gather operational intelligence that could be used to feed surveillance 
teams and interrogations.98  The successful use of operational intelligence helped destabilize 
the PIRA and fracture its powerful public image.  One of the major advantages of these 
types of CI operations is the means to act at will.  Another advantage of these CE operations 
was that with the penetration, the aggressor eliminated PIRA’s ability to “operate 
clandestinely and maintain at all times the essential element of surprise.”99  
Other early CE operations focused on penetrating PIRA’s CI and security apparatus.   
With that penetration, they learned what PIRA’s structure was and how it worked, which 
allowed for more focused surveillance and enabled MI-5, along with other British services, to 
identify candidates for recruitment to become double agents from within the organization. 
With this accomplished, the CE operations next concentrated on penetrating the heart of the 
organization, which involved both the collection of valuable threat information on target 
selection and planning and the study of PIRA’s military strategy.    
Many Irish saw the British as “occupiers”,100 while the PIRA were perceived as the 
good forces who fought to push out these oppressive forces.101  Like many paramilitary 
groups fighting for a cause, PIRA took up efforts within their communities that legitimized 
its group, calling to young, disenchanted youth and speaking to the poor.  PIRA flooded 
Ireland with money from charities and groups outside the United Kingdom (UK).  They 
urged the youth to fight for a cause, employing TTPs that centered on intimidation, 
subversion, and terrorist-like behaviors.  A response was needed to tackle this issue and 
provide warning to the British Army. The British needed real-time intelligence that could 
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assist in disrupting assassinations, bombings, and other violent acts.  As a result, the British 
military created a joint CI unit named the Force Research Unit (FRU).   
“The FRU recruited and ran agents within PIRA.”102  FRU essentially recruited PIRA 
members already working within the organization as double agents.  The “Program”, as it 
was called, emphasized the recruitment of British military soldiers that had familial ties or 
who grew up in controlled PIRA areas.103   The Program not only recruited soldiers to be 
double agents, but also pursued soldiers who had experience and background in explosives, 
weapons and intelligence, skills that were badly in need by PIRA.  This almost guaranteed 
the asset direct access to planning and PIRA capabilities.  The double agents were providing 
information ranging from low- grade to high-grade intelligence, which spanned from gossip 
to imminent attacks on British targets.104  This program was highly effective for several 
reasons. First, other penetrations the British security services were running within PIRA’s 
internal security service provided their handlers what PIRA needed and insights on next 
moves. Second, PIRA needed recruits with experience who could be trusted, and the British 
security services provided them in the form of soldiers.  These former British soldiers were 
under British control with skills the PIRA needed. Finally, once their double agents were 
established, the British were able to effectively and surgically destabilize PIRA’s leadership 
and morale.105    
 However, MI-5 and the UK’s other intelligence elements were not the only side to 
engage in CE.   PIRA adopted passive and active methods of CE as well.   PIRA employed 
passive methods to vet volunteers prior to PIRA acceptance, and adopted CI as a top 
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priority for the organization.   An example of this was how PIRA took a more violent and 
harsh approach on internal security measures in order to deal with suspected MI-5 
informants and collaborators. 
PIRA deceiving MI-5/FRU  
As Mobley highlighted in Terrorism and Counterintelligence, MI-5 and the FRU were not 
the only organizations that successfully ran aggressive CE operations.  PIRA was able to 
mount successful CE operations aimed at ferreting out double agents working for the FRU.  
This was done at times by applying the lessons learned from British run operations. PIRA’s 
most successful CE operations were the penetration and compromise of the UK’s treasury 
department, and the West German operation and the retrieval of the Castlereagh Special 
Branch headquarters files on informants actively supporting UK security service operations.  
The compromise of UK treasury department workers helped identify government checks 
sent to citizens who were providing information on PIRA activities in the controlled 
territory.106  
The second compromise was decried by British tabloids as “catastrophic a failure of 
British intelligence as was Kim Philby’s defection to Moscow a generation ago.”107  The 
result of the compromise of joint British and West Germany CI operations was the loss of 
several direct access cooperating sources that fed information to the UK’s security services.  
Research shows that PIRA kept these records for a period of time prior to releasing them, 
which, if true, would mean that PIRA’s CI staff identified the cooperating sources and either 
executed or turned the UK’s security service operations against them.108  The “infiltration of 
the Castlereagh Special Branch headquarters in 2002 netted the IRA computer disks with the 
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names and addresses of more than 250 serving and former Special Branch, the code names 
of informers, and details of the information they provided to the security services.”109 
Saudi Security and Intelligence Services vs. Al Qaeda Arabian Peninsula 
Saudi Arabia Intelligence Double Agent Operation 
 In 2012, the Saudi external and internal intelligence services, along with the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), participated in an operation that enabled one of the first 
publicly known penetrations of Al-Qaeda.   Nevertheless, there is evidence that the Saudi 
internal and external intelligence services had been performing these types of operations for 
years.110  For instance, Saudi internal and external intelligence services disrupted a plot to 
take down U.S. airliners with a new explosive device that was potentially difficult for U.S. 
transportation security screeners to detect.111    
Prior to the Saudi disruption of the operations by the Al-Qaeda Yemen based group, 
one of the would-be bombers was actually a Saudi intelligence double agent.112  The goal of 
the double agent was to penetrate Al-Qaeda in Yemen and convince his handlers of his 
loyalty in order to gain access to planning activities.  However, one ripple occurred, and the 
double agent was not granted access to the planners, as the Saudi Security services would 
have thought.  Instead the double agent was kept far away from the planning cell and was 
trained only in detonation of the bomb.113  Eventually, the agent’s Al Qaeda handlers gave 
him orders to use the new explosive device, which he communicated with his Saudi 
handlers, and he was instructed to slip away with the device and as much “valuable 
information” as possible.114 After this operation, former Director of the CIA Michael 
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Hayden said that  “the effect is everyone on the inside is now looking at everybody else on 
the inside, and you’re creating suspicions inside the network.”115 
Evidence of VNSAs Deceiving States  
Hezbollah vs. Israel 
Carl Anthony Wege has provided a historical review of the organizational structure 
of Hezbollah and its CI operational successes after the 2006 conflict with Israel.   
Hezbollah's intelligence and counterintelligence roots are found within the Iranian Pasadran 
and Quds forces.116  Wege specifically emphasized that non-state actors that receive state 
assistance (Iran was providing aid to Hezbollah) are truly a force with which to be reckoned.  
Groups like Hezbollah have received funding, training, and weapons from Iran since the 
inception of the group, as confirmed in the Middle East Institute article, “Hezbollah Deputy 
Leader Expresses Gratitude in Iran and Syria”.117    
Hezbollah has a very extensive history of running CI and CE operations, detecting 
spies, and manipulating state intelligence security services.  Wege’s brief historical overview 
of Hezbollah CI operations began in the late 1980s, when the organization identified several 
Lebanese nationals who were employees of the Lebanese Cyprus ferry lines and providing 
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information on passengers and cargo to the CIA. 118 An additional gain for Hezbollah was 
acquiring the knowledge that the CIA was actively developing and recruiting sources of 
information using the ferry lanes.   Just as Hezbollah was smuggling equipment and 
information into the region, the CIA was doing the same.  Another major Hezbollah CI 
victory occurred in 1994, when the group prevented the CIA-engineered kidnapping of a 
senior Hezbollah officer who ran its foreign operations branch.119120 Hezbollah identified the 
compromised Amal agent who was assisting the CIA and exploited that nexus to prevent the 
kidnapping.121  Essentially, Hezbollah had turned the CIA’s prized asset into its weakest link.     
Hezbollah’s use of CE against the Israeli security services went on display from 1997 
through 2000.   In 1997, Hezbollah manipulated IDF double agents by providing them with 
deceptive information that led to the death of elite Israeli naval commandos.122  One of 
Hezbollah’s most sophisticated CI operations occurred three years later: the reversing of an 
Israeli Mossad false flag operation that had been launched at Hezbollah.123  Rather than 
resulting in a success for Mossad, Hezbollah lured the Mossad officer to Lebanon, where he 
was arrested.124   
Well before the summer of 2006, Hezbollah had initiated efforts to disrupt and blind 
the Israeli intelligence network in Lebanon.   During the 2006 IDF vs. Hezbollah conflict, 
unbeknownst to Israel security services, Hezbollah CI officers compromised IDF Lt. Col 
Omar al-Heib, who provided detailed “surveillance data on IDF military installations to 
                                                        









Hizballah in return for narcotics.”125  Wege’s review of Hezbollah’s CI use paints a picture of 
the sophistication, growth, and desire for more offensive-based activities that emerged to 
enhance the organization’s military capabilities and operations against Israel. 
This case study particularly highlighted a non-state sponsored group’s use of multiple 
modes of deception to mask the employment of advanced weapons systems, combining 
them with irregular tactics to inflict lethal consequences on an adversary.  The significance of 
Hezbollah’s strategy is a warning to many countries that rely on hard power.   Hezbollah, a 
non-state actor, had the ability to run effective CE operations against Israel, which has one 
of the most feared intelligence and security services in the world.126 The human sources did 
not completely destroy the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or Israel, but they helped paint a 
picture that deceived the IDF.   
Hezbollah had initiated the deception campaign years before.127 However, the other 
unique aspect of this war was the calculated planning and deliberate employment of a 
deception campaign by its leadership. The group approached a military conflict with Israel in 
a manner similar to the application of game theory.128  It was clear that the IDF reacted the 
way in which Hezbollah expected. As a result, Hezbollah could then engage the IDF’s heavy 
armor and soldiers lethally, causing the IDF to take pause.  In the 2006 case, the group also 
showed reliance on outside influences like Iran, which provided Hezbollah with the 
advanced weapons, advanced signals, intelligence equipment, and essential Israeli strategic 
intelligence vulnerabilities that allowed Hezbollah to use missiles to exploit the IDF, causing 
a number of civilian casualties within Israel.   However, the IDF could also exploit 
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Hezbollah’s reliance on Iran to become Hezbollah’s greatest weakness, particularly if a 
dedicated strategic counterintelligence campaign was launched by the IDF. Thus, this 
campaign would not only have to focus on Hezbollah, but on Iran as well.  A closer review 
of the deception is needed to showcase the effectiveness of the VNSA’s ability deceive a 
hard power reliant state actor.   
The Deception Dimension 
Hezbollah’s use of deception is of great note.  Hezbollah’s overall military strategy shocked 
many western militaries because of its sophistication, deliberateness, and ability to inflict 
surprise upon the IDF, which is one of the most capable militaries in the Middle East.  The 
initiator of deception (Hezbollah) upon the target (IDF) was a deliberate campaign designed 
to effectively blind the IDF’s military and civilian intelligence apparatus.  Hezbollah’s use of 
deception was prevalent in four areas: 
Act Level of Warfare Description 
Fake Bunkers Tactical Hezbollah built fake bunkers to confuse 
Israeli Intelligence about the actual location 




Tactical/Operational Hezbollah bluffed about being able to listen 
into Israeli security frequency hopping 
radios. 
The Media  Operational Hezbollah used the media as its tool to 




Tactical/Operational  Hezbollah “hid” on the internet service 
providers in the US to maintain its capability 
to broadcast via broadband. 
Figure 1. Hezbollah’s use of deception.129 
Hezbollah’s hybrid military strategy sent a message to Israel and others that Hezbollah could 
humiliate the IDF.   Within the opening hours of the war, the IDF launched a brutal air 
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campaign into the south of Lebanon.   The “five key Israeli objectives for the war” 
included:130 
 Destroy the Iranian Western Command before Iran could “go nuclear”; 
 Restore the credibility of Israeli deterrence after the unilateral withdrawal from 
Lebanon in 2000 and Gaza in 2005, and counter the image that Israel was weak and 
forced to leave; 
 Force Lebanon to become and act as an accountable state, and end the status of 
Hezbollah as state within a state; 
 Damage or cripple Hezbollah, with the understanding that it could not be destroyed 
as a military force and would continue to be a major political actor in Lebanon;  
 Bring the two captured Israeli soldiers back alive without major trades in prisoners 
held by Israel. 
Within hours of the war’s initiation, the IDF Navy created a blockade on Lebanese ports 
with the hope of cutting off illegal weapon shipments. The IDF air campaign began with a 
series of hard-hitting attacks, targeting missile locations and infrastructure and hitting “54 
long range rocket and missile launch sites in 39 minutes on the first day of the conflict.” 131   
However, the IDF and the Israel populace were still coming under siege from Hezbollah 
“Katyusha rockets on Israel’s northern towns and villages daily”,132  while in the first three 
days of the attack, IDF’s air assault appeared to do little to no damage to Hezbollah’s rocket 
barrages.133 
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Blinding the IDF through Denial Operations 
Years before the 2006 offensive, Hezbollah aimed to deny Israel the use of sensors.    
In this case, the sensors were Israeli run human intelligence networks that had been targeted 
and exploited years in advance.134  Hezbollah developed a counterintelligence capability 
through the use of signals intelligence collection to produce actionable information that 
allowed its security apparatus to identify Israeli-run human intelligence networks.    
Hezbollah would then approach the suspected spies working for Israel and, similar to the 
British DC Operation, would either double them or arrest them.135 Hezbollah did not end 
double agent operations there, however, but identified other Israel intelligence networks that 
were reporting on Hezbollah weapons cache locations and other sites, again using the double 
agent concept to “turn” these new agents to deliver inaccurate information.  As Perry and 
Crooke state, “Hezbollah effectively closed down Israel’s human intelligence capability”, 136 
and the results were highly damaging to IDF’s overall fighting strategy in 2006.  
Bunkers-  
Shortly after the Israeli withdrawal from Southern Lebanon, Hezbollah began to lay 
the foundations to use deception to inflict strategic surprise upon the IDF.  This included 
test cases and other mechanisms to practice deception. From the year 2000 onwards, 
Hezbollah implemented an “elaborate construction effort of display fortification along the 
Blue Line with the intent of deceiving information gathering assets such as Israel unmanned 
aerial vehicles, United Nation (UN) monitors, and Lebanese spying for Israel.”137  Following 
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these deceptive measures, Hezbollah targeted Israeli intelligence sensors (UAVs, UN 
monitors, spies), and deliberately provided observables to the overt and clandestine Israel 
intelligence sensors, informing them that these were the Hezbollah bunkers. During the 
2006 conflict, it became known that those bunkers were decoys.  During the construction 
time frame of the dummy bunkers, Hezbollah was building the real bunkers to be used for a 
conflict with the IDF elsewhere.   Tunnels and fiber were laid; creating a communications 
network that could prevent disruption by IDF electronic countermeasures.138  The results of 
this deliberate deception targeting Israel’s intelligence sensors conditioned the IDF to believe 
they knew the location of Hezbollah’s bunkers early on in the campaign, allowing Hezbollah 
to operate elsewhere with little threat of an IDF attack. The results gave Hezbollah the 
tactical breathing space to effectively engage IDF ground forces.139  
Electronic Warfare-  
Hezbollah essentially planted information through counterintelligence operations 
(and executed through electronic communications) that would be received by IDF signals 
intelligence systems.  The information Hezbollah planted suggested that they were somehow 
able to decrypt IDF secure communications.  IDF military analysts concluded that this must 
have been one of the reasons as to why IDF efforts in the south of Lebanon had been going 
so poorly.140  Analysis after the fact proved that Hezbollah (with the assistance of Iran) had 
not actually hacked or cracked the encryption.141  What Hezbollah really did was create doubt 
within the IDF about its communications, and through timing and the use of the media, 
enhance the planted information, further allowing the lie to form into a reality.   The 
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operational implications caused the IDF to take a tactical pause and “rethink their 
communications network in the wake of Hezbollah’s alleged EW capabilities.”142   
The Media-   
Hezbollah had propaganda material ready to provide the media outlets before the 
conflict began as well as during the war. Hezbollah messaged the content in a manner that 
misled the media and Israeli society, specifically targeting journalists with the facts and 
stories they wanted printed.143   
Hijacking the Internet-  
Hezbollah also displayed its cyber prowess during the 2006 conflict, deliberately 
employing an offensive cyber campaign, which, while not as strong as a state-sponsored 
campaign was nonetheless highly significant. In order to balance the IDF’s computer 
network operations, Hezbollah built extensions off US based network routers that would be 
used in the event that Israel tried to deny Hezbollah’s communications infrastructure.  
Hezbollah identified a series of websites primarily located in the US that were vulnerable to 
Hezbollah cyber tools and hijacked them.144  These websites served as tunnels for covert 
communications, though the overall application failed due to the efforts of informal, non-
state sponsored networked groups such as the Society for Internet Research, who were able 
to track Hezbollah’s activities and report them to the US government.145 
 The use of deception in the 2006 Hezbollah and IDF conflict is of great importance, 
particularly in the context of the employment of SCIOs. During this type of warfare, 
information has become a critical element to either support a hybrid military strategy or 
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counter a military strategy employed to defeat hybrid challengers.  Information for targeting, 
propaganda use, and defense decision-making has to be protected from manipulation and 
deception from a hybrid challenger.   
David Acosta has proposed that “Hezbollah and Israel serve as the perfect backdrop 
to examine the effects of deception in current asymmetric conflicts.”146  The comparison 
Acosta chose is the contemporary David vs. Goliath battle, in which David is represented by 
Hezbollah and Goliath is Israel.   David balanced Goliath’s clear hard power advantage 
through the use of deception, which inflicted military and technical surprise upon the IDF, 
reducing the advantage the IDF had in several military areas, and making the battle an even 
fight.   Acosta cites the work of Marvin Kalb, who wrote The Israel-Hezbollah War of 2006: The 
Median as a Weapon in Asymmetrical Conflict, in which he expressed the conclusion that 
Hezbollah won in the area of “information and news propaganda”.147  Both authors have 
attributed Hezbollah’s success to the use of makara, which is the Arabic word for deception. 
The variable that helps non-state actors like Hezbollah is the openness of democracies such 
as Israel. Israel, as described by both authors, is a relatively open society that is at times very 
critical of its own political, defensive and national leadership, with contention among diverse 
opinions sometimes hampering the process of decision-making and disrupting the 
momentum of offensive actions. Hezbollah’s closed society and ability to control the news 
flow and propaganda bombarding its supporters is one of its greatest strengths, because it 
helps the organization remain resilient in the face of the hard Israeli military approach to the 
Hezbollah issue.    
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What these authors mean is that every hard power attack launched by the IDF opens 
up the IDF more to Hezbollah’s influence, and risks manipulation of the IDF’s intended 
mission. The authors also highlighted that Hezbollah’s information collection operations 
took place through the use of offensive counterintelligence operations, or CE.  These 
operations led to the collection of valuable foreign intelligence on the IDF that was used in 
turn to collect more information and enhance Hezbollah’s deception campaigns to neutralize 
IDF military tactics.  It is clear that this was the result of IDF’s significant hard power 
capability.148  Acosta’s research cites specific examples of Hezbollah’s employment of 
deception tactics through information sources such as human assets, news media outlets, 
and social media posts, arguing that all assisted in “significantly offset[ing] many of Israel’s 
hard power advantages.”149  Acosta’s research offers a new model for information flow to 
the hierarchy, which gives insight to how Hezbollah’s use of deception masked their tactics, 
objectives, and reduced IDF’s ability to provide warning.      
In actuality, IDF’s intelligence apparatus had no indications or warning that 
Hezbollah was planning such a grand operation. Part of the challenge that Hezbollah 
continues to pose to the IDF is in its ability to employ conventional warfare-like tactics, 
employing high tech and low tech weapons effectively while using highly skilled irregular 
tactics, coordinated operations, and sophisticated communications to strike with precision.  
As Hoffman has assessed, Hezbollah “withstood the attack and fought back. It did not wage 
a guerilla war either… it was not a regular army but was not a guerilla in the traditional sense 
either.  It was something in between. This is the new model”. 150   
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Al-Qaeda vs. CIA 
In the 1990s, Al-Qaeda was a little known terrorist group primarily based out of the 
country of Sudan.  Its international and popular support grew over the Muslim world.  Al-
Qaeda operated largely under the radar of the US intelligence community, mostly because of 
its ability to conduct counterintelligence activities and feed that collected information to 
enhance their operational security of their cells.  When former CIA director George Tenet 
discussed Al Qaeda’s operational capabilities before the 9/11 Commission, he noted that 
“based on what we know today, the investigation of the 9/11 attacks has revealed no major 
slip in the conspirator’s operational security.”151  In his study, “The 9/11 Attacks-A Study of 
Al Qaeda use of Intelligence and Counterintelligence”, Gaetano J. Ilardi attributed great 
significance to this statement “because it conceded that the hijackers did not reveal their 
intentions, but also because subsequent investigation, even with the benefit of hindsight, was 
unable to detect significant lapses in the conspirator’s counterintelligence tradecraft.”152  
Ilardi’s piece is interesting because rather than highlighting Al Qaeda’s strategies of surprise, 
he simply reminded the reader that Al Qaeda trod a very deliberate path in taking the fight to 
the US.153  In other words, the US had dismissed Al Qaeda, not appreciating the threat, and 
the value of surprise cannot even be assessed because Al Qaeda told the US very publically 
that it would be attacking the homeland.  Ilardi has also noted how Al Qaeda cell formed its 
plan by studying operational realities and developing knowledge of US security and law 
enforcement capabilities, and that much of its operational plan was continually adjusted, 
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even on the day of the execution of the operation.154 This could be a potential area to exploit 
in the future.  
Through his research, Ilardi articulated Al Qaeda’s use of deception and which is 
similar to Russia’s intertwining of deception and OFCO, also known as maskirovka.155156  “In 
fact, this deception proved so effective precisely because it was based on the hijacker’s keen 
knowledge of their adversaries’ own perceptions and preconceived ideas.”157  Al Qaeda’s 
security measures were developed in order to cover all actions before the hijackers ever 
appeared on American soil.   The use of non-alarming personalities did not trigger reactions 
from the US security and law enforcement services, as the selected hijackers were rational 
and able to live the double lives needed to achieve their group’s objectives.  Non-state 
actor’s intelligence and counterintelligence practices seem to be their greatest strength 
because those actions form a security umbrella.  Once that has been compromised, the rest 
of the operational activities can be manipulated and even disrupted.    
Double agents have become a valuable tool for VNSAs, including Al Qaeda.   One 
example is the story of Humam Khalil al-Balawi, the subject of Joby Warrick’s book, The 
Triple Agent: The Al-Qaeda Mole Who Infiltrated the CIA.  This story begins in the country of 
Jordan in 2009.  The CIA and many intelligence services in the Gulf region had been 
inundated with the desire to penetrate Al Qaeda,158  Jordan’s internal security service, known 
as the Mukhabarat, shares a very close relationship with the CIA, often working hand in 
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hand, 159 and the Mukhabarat alerted the CIA of a blogger critical of Western policies whom 
they had been monitoring online.  Investigative reporting by Evan Kohlman later uncovered 
an online profile that actually belonged to Al-Balawi, who had been chatting on various 
online forums linked to Al Qaeda.160  Al-Balawi would not take up issues with the West in 
these discussions, but rather often challenged Jordanians themselves.161 Through some 
means, it was determined that Al-Balawi had access to Al Qaeda, and during interrogations, 
the Jordanians attempted to sway him and convince him to use his access to Al Qaeda to 
assist the Mukhabarat, providing them with key information on members and leaders, and 
sharing knowledge of operational plans.  The Mukhabarat was working to turn Balawi into a 
double agent.       
 Mukhabarat officers suggested that Balawi travel to Pakistan to offer his medical 
services to Al Qaeda.162  From that point, Balawi made his way into Afghanistan, linking up 
with Al-Qaeda.163 Balawi re-contacted the Mukhabarat to inform them that Al Qaeda’s 
members had introduced him to the number two in command, Ayman al-Zawahiri, and sent 
videos of himself treating a senior aide to Osama Bin Laden. 164 Mukhabarat and the CIA 
thought they had finally acquired a source within Al Qaeda.  However, it appears that all 
Balawi was trying to do was increase his bond with the terrorist group  while simultaneously 
working to improve his credibility with the CIA and Mukhabarat. 165   
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Sometime in December 2009, Al Qaeda planned to lure the Mukhabarat officers to a 
meeting location, where Balawai would detonate himself.  Sharing the videos and passing 
accurate information were setting the stage for a re-contact meeting with his CIA and 
Mukhabarat handlers.  According to a later review of the case conducted by Bruce Reidel, 
videos and literature released by Al-Qaeda showed Balawi with an Al-Qaeda leader 
discussing plans to blow up the CIA forward operating base in Khost, Afghanistan.166 Other 
videos appeared to be debriefings conducted by Al-Qaeda members of Balawi, during which 
Balawi detailed how he dangled himself in front of the Mukhabarat, gaining access to 
Mukhabarat headquarters and described meetings with his handlers, revealing his initial 
objective of kidnapping a Mukhabarat officer.167  Balawi himself provided his Al-Qaeda 
handlers the tactics, techniques, and procedures of the Mukhabarat.168  During the interview 
with Balawi, he exploited previous Jordanian Mukhabarat intelligence operations run against 
Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups.  Unbeknownst to the CIA Al-Balawi was already a 
double agent.   
The CIA arranged for Balawi to come to Khost, Afghanistan, where he could be 
debriefed securely.  However, Balawi was never debriefed.  On 30 December 2009 Al-Balawi 
took the lives of nine CIA intelligence officers, including a Mukhabarat officer.   Post-event 
analysis determined three things: Balawi was a triple agent who took direction and orders 
from Al-Qaeda; no formal counterintelligence vetting was ever carried out on Balawi; and Al 
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Qaeda seemed to have run a sophisticated operation that was designed to bait two highly 
experienced intelligence services.169 
Analysis of Data 
Material evidence has been presented to support conclusions 1 (C) and 2 (C): both 
entities can be deceived.   However, the selected test cases focused on the discipline of CI 
collection, which was used to mount effective CE operations that were used on behalf of the 
respective intelligence and security services.  CE operations can have an impact upon a state 
intelligence service as well as non-state intelligence entities.  It is also clear that costs were 
leveled upon the target of the initiator. Essentially, MI-5/FRU teams were successful at 
infiltrating PIRA and destabilizing the organization from within.  The British security 
services were able to “infiltrate the IRA, spreading deceit and rumors of deceit”,170 which 
was a very effective strategy.  Another important point is that the use of operational security 
was paramount to avoid detection by the other side, especially during the information-
gathering phase.  What evidence is missing, whether because it does not exist or has not 
been found, is the deliberate compromise of an operation for the purpose of denying the 
target the ability to gain access to the true intentions of the initiators activity.   That is clear 
use of deception operations designed to actively deny the target access to information of 
value.    
Finally, the initiator defines what “deception” means not contemporary academically 
accepted definitions, and one can argue that PIRA’s use of false information resulted in the 
British being deceived into acting on something false, creating tactical opportunities for 
PIRA.  Hezbollah used deceptive information to identify Israelis intelligence sources and to 
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enhance Hezbollah military operation to create tactical victories and strategically message to 
others regionally that David (Hezbollah) was able to hurt Goliath (Israel).  
MI5/FRU vs. PIRA  
It is important to note the effectiveness of CE operations that the British intelligence 
and security services operated against PIRA. Through placing double agents with skills 
needed by PIRA, the British were able to gain direct access to planning and information on 
the execution of attacks.  As a result, British intelligence and security services could increase 
the credibility of the double agents by placing them into positions that allowed the use of 
techniques to destabilize PIRA from within.   
One of Britain’s most effective double agents was codenamed StakeKnife,171 and his 
role inside the IRA was to manage the CE investigations unit,172 with the primary task being 
to identify British intelligence and security service informants operating within PIRA.173  
StakeKnife’s value was enhanced by his ability to remove any threat to his access afforded by 
his position and alert the British intelligence and security services to the threats they were 
facing.174  Stakeknife was also able to provide access to the most intimate secrets of PIRA 
personnel, which no doubt aided British intelligence and security services in recruiting other 
PIRA members 
Saudi Arabia vs. Al-Qaeda 
 It appears that the Saudi Arabian security services operated much like the MI-5 
activities launched against PIRA.  CE TTPs worked on penetrating and deceiving Al-Qaeda.  
The Saudi government deceived the VSNA Al-Qaeda gave a new weapon to a Saudi 
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“double”, who in turn compromised Al-Qaeda’s sophisticated weapons development and 
next phase of operations. This ultimately led to a paranoid atmosphere within the Al-Qaeda 
ranks.  
Hezbollah vs. Israel 
 Hezbollah’s use of CI and CE operations married with established deception 
practices (camouflage, blinding, cover) directly challenged Israel politically, militarily, and 
diplomatically.   Hezbollah showed great skill and integration of its intelligence, 
counterintelligence, and military units to match up its capabilities to  Israel’s military 
capabilities early on in the 2006 conflict.   Whether or not the concept of hybrid warfare is 
accepted within the US military, the use of deception, double agent operations, married with 
VNSA’s sophisticated strategy and high-tech weapons have proved to be a direct challenge 
to any military.  The other dimension that needs to be fully evaluated is the use of Iranian 
military and intelligence units leading up to the 2006 conflict and how much intelligence was 
transferred to the Iranians from Hezbollah post 2006 conflict.     
AQ Deceiving CIA and Using CIA to Kill AQ Selected Targets 
 The evidence provided through the review of literature makes it very clear that a 
VNSA did deceive two state professional intelligence services.  If the transcripts of Balawi 
are to be believed, then Al Qaeda proved it could penetrate and deceive state intelligence 
services.  One aspect of research that has yet to be explored is whether or not Balawi 
provided actionable intelligence to his Jordanian or CIA handlers while he was in 
Afghanistan or Pakistan.  If so, this is important because it would reveal that Al Qaeda was 
willing to deliberately feed truthful sensitive information, infrastructure, and insights to the 
organization that would entice intelligence and security services targeting Al Qaeda.  The 
intent of providing the CIA with this information would have been to increase the credibility 
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of Balawi.  This would show that the Al Qaeda operations are not short-term, but rather 
more enduring and designed with specific objectives in mind.  The other piece of analysis 
that is lacking is what information the CIA already knew before this case came along. This is 
extremely relevant when trying to detect deceptive information being passed to the CIA 
from Al Qaeda double agents.   According to news reports, unnamed intelligence sources 
claimed that during Balawi’s directed travel to Pakistan and Afghanistan, he provided  
“information that led to the drone-launched missile strikes.”175  If the Al Qaeda transcripts 
from Balawi are true, then was the information the US and Jordan acted upon genuine?   As 
stated previously, Al-Qaeda deceived two professional intelligence services. If Balawi 
provided information on the drone strikes, should we now question which strikes were 
targeted and neutralized?  The major lesson from the Balawi case is alarming for two 
reasons. First, the case received little to no vetting and the CIA did not appear to have been 
concerned that Al Qaeda was able to run this sophisticated of an operation.   Secondly, Al 
Qaeda was able to deliberately launch an offensive CI operation, undermining the internal 
security practices of the Jordanian and American intelligence and security services.   Al 
Qaeda had studied the playbook of the Jordanian security service and engaged in a deliberate 
offensive CI operation effectively feeding false information; that action was taken upon by 
the CIA, and neutralized CIA operations in that portion of Afghanistan.  
Conclusion 
 The analysis of the test cases determined that CE operations are effective when 
initiated by a state or a non-state actor, and that when coupled with other techniques that 
can enhance a deceptive message, CE operations are very effective at enhancing the surprise 
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and lethal capacity of the initiator, which was clear in all cases. Additionally, the analysis 
found that VNSAs employing CE operations in conjunction with a deception campaign 
should be the most worrisome to states.  However, operational securities during the initial 
stages of the operation are crucial, because if detected by the target’s intelligence or security 
service, it will gain ability to manipulate and turn the operation against you quite easily.    
Israel and IDF’s history has shown that nation’s ability to engage in multi-modes of warfare 
as well.   Taking military strategy out of the analysis, the 2006 test case shows the 
effectiveness of CE operations launched to blind the target’s intelligence service and render 
the leadership of the target service or entity without effective information to counter the 
action.   
The second point of note is that VNSAs have the ability to run highly developed 
operations even against sophisticated state actors.   State intelligence services have 
particularly had a history targeting the US for CE operations.  When effective, these 
operations impose a cost on the actor being deceived; however, the deception is employed 
within the context of the information, which conceals who is actually is managing the asset 
feeding the information.   In the case of Al-Qaeda, its operation was so valuable because 
Balawi’s ability to penetrate both major security services showed the susceptibility the CIA 
had to double-agents, especially those who came with information of value to US national 
leadership.  The Balawi case also was a blow to the morale and credibility of the CIA and 
Jordanian intelligence services, and enabled Al-Qaeda to enhance its own CI and CE 
programs through compromising these state actors. This also has become a template for 
other VNSA’s on how to launch operations against sophisticated state intelligence and 
security services.   
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In closing, deception works.  Both sides can be deceived.  However, one of the most 
effective ways to provide indications and warning of attack is to have an asset on the inside.  
In addition, a common means of detecting deception is to launch a deception of your 
own.176    CE is a valuable tool when countering an adversary deception operation, especially 
when the initiator of the deception recruits double agents with critical skills, and when the 
initiating service or entity enhances the credibility of the double agent through other modes 
of deception. 177178 CE operations initiated internally or externally must meet areas of 
weakness, and to effectively engage a VNSA in deception, it is important to identify what the 
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CHAPTER 3: EMPLOYMENT OF U.S. CONTROLLED TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 
TO AIDE U.S. COST IMPOSITION STRATEGIES 
“Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex.  It takes a touch of genius-and a lot of 
courage-to move in the opposite directions.” 
-Ernest Schumacher179 
Research Question 
Can the controlled release of US national security-based research and development 
assist in the implementation of cost imposition strategies against potential challengers? 
Hypothesis 
1 (A) SCIOs designed to support US cost imposition strategies levied against an 
adversary are a potential vehicle to impose costs.   1 (B) SCIOs designed to support US cost 
imposition strategies are effective only in the area of denial, no evidence exists in open 
source research to indicate its utility.     
Introduction 
This research explores the potential relationship between strategic 
counterintelligence and US cost imposition strategies, specifically looking at employing 
SCIOs as a way to deliver a cost to an adversary.  The purpose would be to minimize the risk 
to US national security investments, simultaneously reducing the risk to illegal or clandestine 
technological transfer by providing the adversary through a controlled setting, eliciting a 
response that favorable to the US.  Drawing on other academic research and historical cases 
shows that during the Cold War, the US utilized CE operations to deliver real but tampered 
equipment to the USSR’s science and technology directorates’.180   During the Cold War the 
US National Security Council (NSC) assumed that the KGB would somehow obtain access 
to its secrets through various human sources.   NSC members relied on the KGB’s skills and 
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provided the KGB through double agents and controlled operations with material and data 
they required for Soviet economic means.181  This operation serves as material proof and a 
template for future operations on how to manage countries like China, Russia, and Iran who 
engage in economic espionage activities, which aims to engage in illegal technology transfer.         
The US is the most highly targeted nation in research and development (R&D), as its 
corporations maintain a technological edge in many areas.  The US government develops the 
design and manufacturing of future capabilities that drive our economic interests’ strategic 
capabilities, and in some cases impact the global economy.  Preserving the edge and 
amplifying current and future US capabilities should be a major priority.   
In the 1980s, the Soviet Union depended heavily on the theft of US defense 
technology and manufacturing secrets, and the Pentagon estimated that over 70% of all 
Soviet research and development were reliant on US technology and research.182  Due to the 
KGB’s exercising their capabilities within the US they had several other successes.   The 
Soviets were able to clone the B-1B bomber aircraft and Airborne Warning and Control 
System.183  
The DSS “2015 Targeting U.S. Technologies Report” provided a summary of the 
reporting and analysis of CDC reporting on suspicious events and attempts by foreign 
governments to gain access to US sensitive and classified technologies.  To highlight the 
need for a strategic component of CI and explain why the foreign intelligence entities threat 
is strategic in nature, DSS provided a five year review of technologies that are highly sought 
after by entities in East Asia and the Pacific, which showed that for five years, entities in 
East Asia and the Pacific aggressively sought US technology in electronics, command and 
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control communications, software, aeronautical systems, and marine systems.184  These 
technology areas cost $74.9 billion per year, according to the DoD’s 2014 “Program 
Acquisition Cost By Weapon System”,185 and this figure excludes the $11.5 billion used for 
funding research and development programs, which are primarily executed by CDCs and US 
academic institutions.    
When we discuss CI issues within the domestic framework, the focus is on law 
enforcement investigations that usually target a person engaging in illegal activity.  However, 
CI practiced within the definition of a SCIO aims to reverse the illegal US technology 
transfer to state or non-state actors through commercial, clandestine, and cyber espionage.   
This a change from traditional neutralization approaches that US law enforcement chooses, 
like prosecution.  
This chapter will show that SCIOs can also be useful in US cost-imposition 
strategies.   The literature review is structured to examine the current US literature on cost-
imposition strategy, Russia’s reflexive control, and determine if any CE cases that would 
meet the definition put forth for SCIOs that prove the research conclusions.  The 
importance and inclusion of reflexive control is to highlight the adversary thought in this 
area.  The Russian perspective is designed to use SCIO-like activities to undermine US 
national security through messaging to a target and getting the target to act in a favorable 
way to the initiator.  US SCIOs are worthy of exploration as the counter to reflexive control 
and serve as a means to deliver costs to an adversary like Russia.    
 






“In Peace as well as War a carefully cultivated double agent system is the safest and surest weapon of 




Thomas G. Mahnken wrote that “the competitive strategies approach focuses on the 
peacetime use of latent military power-that is, the development, acquisition, deployment, and 
exercising of forces-to shape a competitor’s choices in ways that favor our objectives.”187  
Mahnken proposed five concepts that can be applied to an actor the US desires to impose a 
cots upon. His particular focus was China, and managing their areas of growth that challenge 
the US’s ability to project power. 188 
 First, the approach is employed against a strategic state actor that has its own 
objectives and ability to formulate its own strategy. 
 Second, both actors have interactions between the competing establishments.  
Each actor makes limited decisions based on their competitor.   
 Third, the competitive strategies approach acknowledges that the choices 
competitors have open to them are constrained.  (limitations in capability and 
resources). 
  Fourth, the competitive approach acknowledges that interactions may play out 
over the course of years or decades. 
 Finally, the competitive strategies approach assumes sufficient under-standing 
of the competitor to be able to formulate and implement a long-
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term…….Effective competitive strategies are predicated on an understanding 
of a competitor’s decision making process and doctrine. 
One form of competitive strategies is a cost-imposition strategy.  Two contemporary 
researchers on cost imposition strategies are Colonel Kenneth Ekman, author of Winning the 
Peace through Cost Imposition and “Applying Cost Imposition Strategies Against China”, and 
Dr. Thomas Mahnken, who published a primer ahead of his book titled Competitive Strategies 
for the 21st Century: Theory, History, and Practice.  Both authors define cost imposition strategies 
as the deliberate programming, planning, budgeting, and equipping process of US military 
forces that will force the competitor to make trade-offs to balance against US military forces.  
 As defined by Ekman, “cost imposition strategies focus on eliciting an adversary 
response that creates a hardship differential favoring the initiating nation”.189  Mahnken, 
along with Bradford Lee’s190 research, seeks to convince an adversary that the costs of 
continued competition or conflict are prohibitively high and that accommodation is a more 
attractive option.”191   
Mahnken and Ekman both note that cost imposition strategies are not just American 
tools: other states apply them to the US as well.   A close comparison in terms of eliciting 
your adversary’s response is the Russian military application of reflexive control.   Reflexive 
control is more focused on the application side of the actual conflict, but its operation 
involves a significant and detailed planning process.192  Reflexive control seeks to impose a 
hard cost on the adversary by enticing the target to attack a particular way by using various 
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techniques relying on human intelligence and information operations.193  When the target 
reacts, the initiator of reflexive control actually knows how the target will react, and the 
applier of reflexive control can inflict such damage to break the will of the target.194     
Noting the use of such strategies among non-state actors, Mahnken particularly cites 
the examples of Al Qaeda and the effects of cyber-espionage.  In Mahnken’s view, when Al 
Qaeda implemented their attacks against the US in 2001, the group may have not calculated 
for the security costs associated with the attack and impact to the US security and 
transportation, in effect causing significant challenges for Al Qaeda exploiting the US 
transportation means for future attacks.195  Cyber-espionage can be argued as one of the 
largest costs to the US government and economy, and with every breach and compromise 
comes at even greater cost.   According to Mahnken, cyber-based attacks on government 
networks “that have triggered the development and deployment of increasing layers of 
security have yielded considerable costs, to include that of developing and fielding cyber 
security capabilities as well as the efficiency losses associated with such security measures.”196     
 Cost-imposition strategies first surfaced in the 1970s within the US government, 
specifically the Department of Defense (DoD).197 The US was facing budget shortfalls, 
domestic economic challenges, and the persistent threat of a capable communist competitor.  
An example of the cost imposition strategy the US pursued, as identified by Ekman and 
Mahnken, is the research, development, and fielding of the US Air Force’s stealth fighter and 
bomber programs.   With the release of these aircraft, the Soviets would be forced to 
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develop a whole new set of countermeasures to defend their airspace, harden strategic 
targets, and expend clandestine intelligence sources who would attempt to collect 
information on the secretive programs that would benefit Soviet weapon and 
countermeasure programs.   The use of cost-imposition strategies dates back to “Athens and 
Sparta in the third century.”198  It is a state option that was formulated within an overall 
strategy.         
 Cost-imposition within the US security context focuses primarily on fiscal, security 
and political realities.  Ekman and Mahnken’s research reveals that cost imposition is a 
deliberate strategy that works best as a preliminary defense framework, rather than during 
times of active conflict, and that it is based on fiscal realities, meaning that a government 
must have the resources to invest in developing the programs designed to trigger the 
adversary countermeasures.199  These US defense investments will elicit a response from the 
adversary.  One of the main principals’ areas where SCIO’s can be married up with is in the 
area of Denial, which is one of the principal elements of cost imposition, “denial, cost-
imposition, attacking the enemy’s strategy, and attacking the enemy’s political system.”200      
The desired objective of this employment strategy is to deter one’s adversary from 
initiating attacks.   In short, a denial operation looks to “make it hard for the adversary to 
translate its operational means into political ends that it desires.”201  It may involve 
transforming defense investments into new technologies that would force an adversary to 
either organically research and develop a countermeasure or steal it.   The denial operation 
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may be focused on containing one’s adversaries’ abilities to organically research and develop 
a technology, or preventing the theft of that technology elsewhere.    
 The other portion of the strategy is “attacking the enemy’s strategy”, which 
incorporates two modes of operation: reactive and proactive, both of which serve the 
purpose of manipulating the interaction with one’s adversary, forcing it to destabilize its 
strategy on its own through the modes of operation employed by the initiator.202  As defined 
by Bradford Lee, proactive approaches involve “inducing strategically self-defeating behavior 
on the enemy side is on those non-Western enemies of the United States use more readily 
than leaders who emerge from American strategic culture and educational institutions.”203  In 
other words, through its interaction with the adversary, the initiator attempts to get the 
target to engage in some type of self-defeating behavior.  
From a national security perspective, the United States is failing to recognize that it is 
entering an era of total warfare because it continues to view targets with conventional lenses.  
In other words, it has been fighting on a 1950s model against state actors such as Russia, 
China, and Iran.  The current situation is that the United States is also facing violent non-
state actors that are used as proxies, which assists state actors in skirting internationally, 
accepted laws or norms.  
CE Operations Imposing Costs on Initiators 
 During the Cold War, several cases highlighted the use of coordinated double-cross-
like system operations that influenced the target to recruit potential sources of information, 
engage in national decisions leading to false investments, and paint a picture of the operation 
initiator that was not advantageous to the target of the operation.  
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 The Farewell Operation is probably one of the most daring and innovative CE 
operations in history.   “Farewell”, a Soviet engineer also known as Col. Vladimir I. Vetrov, 
was working within KGB’s Directorate T,204 which was responsible for the supervision and 
evaluation of technical intelligence collected by Line X,205 the clandestine collection program 
set up “to obtain technical and scientific knowledge from the West.”206  
Vetrov offered his services to the DST, the French security service, which mainly 
specialized in counterintelligence rather than foreign intelligence.207 Some researchers have 
assessed that Vetrov chose the DST because he was concerned for his safety and he had 
intimate knowledge of penetrations within western intelligence services.208  The KGB and 
the Soviet Union did not really consider France an enemy, as the country had recently 
elected a socialist prime minister.209  Vetrov ultimately found that a counterintelligence 
service was much more difficult to penetrate than anticipated.210 
 Unbeknownst to the DST and “Farewell”, President Ronald Reagan, who had taken 
office only a year earlier, and his national security team strongly aspired to win the Cold War.  
Reagan and his staff did not believe the Soviet economic system was working as efficiently as 
the Soviets thought, and they were right.  Coming into the Reagan administration, were 
several national security advisors focused on exerting “economic pressure” on the Soviet 
system.211 The policy based on that hypothesis was to develop a strategy to “take advantage 
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of the USSR’s low productivity, its lag in technology, oppressive defense burden, and 
inefficient economic structure.”212    
In late 1981, Dr. Gus W. Weiss, who served as Special Assistant to the Defense and 
as the Director of International Economics for the National Security Council, was briefed 
about the Farewell case.  Dr. Weiss carried on some research that began under the Carter 
administration, the purpose of which was to assess the Soviets’ interest in acquiring US 
technologies illegally.213  The briefing or Farewell couldn’t have come at a better time. French 
President Mitterand briefed President Ronald Reagan on a source of information that was 
placed within the KGB’s Line T, who evaluated the intelligence gathered from Line X.  This 
source of information provided volumes of data, which detailed gaps in Soviet technological 
knowledge and capability, identified more than 200 Line X KGB officers and 100 leads to 
recruited KGB sources, and demonstrated how a large majority of Soviet R&D relied on the 
West.214  “Farewell” had confirmed the suspicions of many on the National Security Council 
that Soviet R&D and its national defense was benefiting from illegal technology transfer 
through Line X officers’ clandestine collection program.215  The primary areas of Line X 
intelligence collection were in the areas of “radar, computers, machine tools, and 
semiconductors.”216  The assessment was that Line X was asked to collect certain 
information on key technologies and had “fulfilled two-thirds to three-fourths of its 
collection requirements.”217  The conclusion of the assessment was that through the French 
DST, the CIA now had the “shopping list of still-needed technology, and with the list 
American intelligence might be able to control for its purposes at least part of Line X’s 
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collection, that is, turn the tables on the KGB and conduct economic warfare of our 
own.”218 
Weiss’s new playbook utilized the analysis of the Farewell material “to feed or play 
back the products sought by Line X”, 219 but instead of KGB sources, it would come from 
US human sources (doubles), providing Line X with “improved” designs of technologies 
they still needed. The technologies would be genuine, pass inspection, and when integrated 
into Soviet R&D, the article would fail.  Based on the dynamics and behaviors at the time, 
the risk of compromise existed. However, Weiss felt that “if some double agent told the 
KGB the Americans were alert to Line X and were interfering with their collection by 
subverting, if not sabotaging, the effort I believed the United States could not lose.”  Due to 
their extreme paranoia, it was assessed that the KGB would more than likely “reject 
everything Line X collected.”220  The conclusion: it would be a win for the US and a 
significant loss for the USSR, posing a significant cost to the latter.    
The CIA, Department of Defense, and FBI set up a task force to do what was 
theorized.   They evaluated foreign companies, licenses, and people, and introduced the 
improved products, designs, and material to Line X sources through doubles.  The result of 
this operation severely impacted the USSR, as “contrived computer chips found their way 
into Soviet military equipment, flawed turbines were installed on a gas pipeline, and defective 
plans affected the output of chemical plants.”221  The DOD planted misleading information 
on “stealth aircraft, space defense, and tactical aircraft.”222  Upon the decision of the closing 
down of the operations the USIC was not selfish, they accordingly alerted their allies, who 
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expelled over 200 Line X collection officers globally, leading to the collapse of the 
clandestine collection program.223   
Analysis of SCIO’s, Cost Imposition, and the Effect on the Target 
“Why not help the Soviets with their shopping? Now that we know what they want, we can help them get 
it.”224 – Gus Weiss 
 Having the knowledge of a country’s shopping list of technologies needed to become 
more economically competitive in today’s global market place would be any secret worth 
protecting, buying, and exploiting to any country.  Some factors that were critical to the 
success of this operation include: 
 The Soviet’s technological areas of weakness were the US’s strengths, namely 
computers and microelectronics, an area in which, according to the former science 
and technology chief Roald Sagdeev, the USSR trailed the US by 15 years before 
the initiation of the CE activity feeding the Soviets technology through controlled 
operations.225 
 The target of the SCIO primarily relied on its foreign intelligence and security 
service to illegally acquire US technologies that ranged from unclassified to top-
secret materials.226  They utilized tradecraft associated with a foreign intelligence 
and security service operating within the US.  Through the initiation of a few US 
based CE activities; the US was able to exploit the KGB’s Line X clandestine 
network.227  
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 Just one CE operation ran off of information provided by Farewell, which allowed 
the KGB to steal software from a Canadian company that had a Trojan horse 
embedded in the code, and would cost the Soviets over 8 billion a year in 1980 
dollars.228   
 Over 70% of Soviet defense research was derived from the illegal technology 
transfer from US defense contractors to the Soviets through Line X operations.229      
Conclusion 
SCIOs are highly effective at imposing a cost against the targeted adversary.  This 
was proven and demonstrated by numerous Cuban, East German, and Russian operations 
launched at the United States.   However, the most compelling case for SCIOs is 
demonstrated by the review of “Operation Farewell”, a program that proved to be extremely 
costly to the Russians politically, economically, and affecting their defense investments.  
Farewell’s revelations “exposed the abject failure of the Communist system to match rapid 
Western advances in electronic micro-technology.”230  As described in previous research, a 
task force was set up within the US to take advantage of this strategic technological 
weakness, and a large and complex US CE operation was initiated to continue to allow the 
illegal acquisitions by Line X officers to collect “advanced” and “manipulated” technology.231  
This, in turn, led to the collapse of the Soviets’ clandestine technology collection program.   
In short, the United States’ ability to both engage and implement cost imposition strategies 
in denial operations and attack its adversaries strategically acted as a catalyst, leading to the 
collapse of the Soviet economic and defense structure.   The “Farewell” revelations helped 
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to point out critical gaps in the main adversary’s capabilities.   This research also provided a 
strong argument for Mahnken and Ekman cost imposition strategies, especially when the 
adversaries we face today practice a form of reflexive control.  In terms of a potential US 
strategy, cost imposition is the US’s answer to counter reflexive control, and SCIO’s are the 
delivery mechanism to message to the adversary through the use of specially packaged 
information or material to entice the adversary to make a move that is advantageous to the 
US.  Taking advantage of an adversary’s weakness is a key element in warfare.  
To fully evaluate if the hypothesis stands true, however, further research needs to be 
conducted to determine whether or not a US SCIO-like system can survive in today’s ever-
evolving security environment.  Namely, can a double-cross like system survive today in a 
cyber environment that appears to be a major challenge to the US, particularly considering 




CHAPTER 4: IS THE DOUBLE-CROSS SYSTEM WITHIN THE A VIABLE COST 
IMPOSTION STRATEGY COUNTERING CYBER ESPIONAGE?  
 “Pretend inferiority and encourage his arrogance”232 
-Sun Tzu 
Question:  Are SCIOs possible in cyber-space, and is it technically feasible to reverse 
computer network exploitations (CNE)? Are SCIOs a viable option to increasing the cost 
and risk of states, organizations, and groups who attempt to exploit stolen US Government 
data? Can this be achieved with existing capabilities and techniques? 
Hypothesis: A cyber SCIO using a contemporary network environment would be no 
different from what the British employed during World War II.  The computer and network 
are the new wireless radio set and selected transmission system for already recruited double 
agents or agents waiting for adversarial recruitment and employment. SCIOs are a viable 
option to increasing the costs and risk of states, organizations, and groups who exploit US 
government data. They are technically feasible based on tested and approved research.  
Historical research leads to a conclusion that SCIOs in cyberspace, integrated with physical 
agents, will effectively increase the believability of the data provided from both channels of 
clandestine communication, thus providing opportunities to elicit a response favorable to the 
initiator.  However, the scalability and capacity to conduct large-scale SCIOs cannot be fully 








Introduction to Focus 
The true cost of cyberespionage remains elusive-costs measured in terms of economic deprivation and loss of 
technical military dominance-although it is clear that the transfer of cutting edge military technology to 
America’s adversaries endangers the lives of U.S. military personal and strengthens the resolve of those 
nations who wish to thwart American political objectives.233 
 The focus of this chapter is to evaluate the effectiveness of conducting SCIOs in 
cyberspace and to determine if this is technically possible, or if the attack might be reversed 
upon the initiator.   The objective of SCIOs launched through a cyber environment is to 
protect US national security infrastructure, data and information.  Based on a current review 
of US cyber security policy, current cyber security practices place focus on defense in depth 
practices with a mixture of software designed to detect malicious incoming activity, 
monitoring of outbound network traffic looking for anomalous messages, locking down of 
permissions of the user, and education of the users.234   
Current cyber security strategies do not involve the use of honeypots or decoy networks, 
and reversing a cyber-attackers operation against the attacker is not a common protection 
practice within the United States or within the department of defense.  There is no global 
enforcement body that targets and punishes countries, companies, and cyber actors for theft 
of intellectual property rights, stealing foreign government research and development, or 
employing malware to disrupt informational environments.   Yet even having such an entity 
in place would not address the fundamental problem.   The fundamental problem with the 
internet is that it was founded to support individuals access to information without any 
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thought of security integrated into its development.   It is unknown whether a global appetite 
exists to develop a new cyber infrastructure and not likely to be discussed in the near future.  
The only way to begin to form a solution for nefarious cyber actors is to manage the cyber 
actor.   In doing so, we must raise the costs upon our adversaries.  
John Reed has observed that “Denial and Deception is key to changing the way we look 
at these things, being proactive on the network, not in an offensive, aggressive way”, but by 
creating capabilities that “make things more difficult for the adversaries” by giving them bad 
information and quickly identifying the attackers.”235 Engaging in offensive 
counterintelligence or CE operations in cyberspace appears to be a large part of the solution 
to managing the cyber actor and driving the cost up for adversaries and competitor.   A 
private consulting company has suggested that businesses in the commercial environment 
have employed these techniques already.236  As a representative of that company informed 
the magazine Foreign Policy, they are employing cyber deception techniques that are used to 
poison the data that attacker’s exfiltrate from the network. The company was specifically 
engaged in using CE practices within the cyber realm to identify competitors, with the aim of 
allowing the cyber actor to “compromise” the network and steal data the company wanted 
the attacker to steal.  The defensive practice is identifying a network compromise, studying 
the attacker, evaluating the data taken, and then inserting material that would include various 
malicious exploits of the company’s own.237 
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In Chapter 3, research concluded that adversary CE operations initiated by Cuba, East 
Germany, and Russia devastated the credibility of the CIA and US national security.  US 
intelligence operations aimed at stealing foreign governments secrets came at a cost, 
especially when the US found out that a majority of the sources in Cuba, East Germany, and 
in Russia were CE operations initiated by the respective security services.   The operations 
blinded the USIC from what was actually happening within the respective countries.  In 
other words, US adversaries controlled clandestine channels of communication, effectively 
creating desirable outcomes for their operations.   
Through the passage of false information to US intelligence officers, foreign intelligence 
analysts shaped the view of American leaders.  For a period of time, the US believed that the 
USSR’s military capabilities were far more powerful than they really were.  The late Barton 
Whaley was asked about whether it was possible to resurrect a double-cross like system and 
his assessment identified two conditions and scenarios under which this could occur: 
through “(a) complete control over any single channel of communication; and (b) 
confidence in at least one feedback channel from the enemy that the system is working 
unsuspected.”238  Networks with servers and personal computers owned by the defender can 
manage the information coming in and going out.  Using an assortment of cyber techniques 
that are common in physical practice within CE operations can create multiple feedback 
loops to determine who has stolen the data, where the stolen data has gone, the 
infrastructure set up to hide the stolen data, and depending on the tools used, tell the 
defender who is benefitting from the stolen information.   
To put things in context, evidence that was collected when the famed KGB archivist 
Vasili Nikitich Mitrokhin defected to the United Kingdom in 1992 uncovered this startling 
                                                        
238 Whaley and Aykroyd. Turnabout and Deception     
68 
 
discovery about the external source of much Soviet science and technology: “the Soviets 
estimate that by using documentation on the US F-18 fighter their aviation and radar 
industries saved five years of development time and 35 million roubles”.239  The cost 
equivalent in 1980 dollars is $55 million.240   
Introduction to the Cyber Security Environment (Shaping) 
Cyberspace, cyber security, and hacking are terms with which we have all become  
familiar.  They are a key challenge for the US, particularly due to the strong dependence on 
cyberspace and the global reliance on the Internet.   
To define the context of cyberspace for the purpose of this research, the following 
definition by Singer and Friedman was chosen: “cyberspace is first and foremost an 
informational environment, made up of digitized data that is created, stored, and most 
importantly, shared.”241  This definition is important because “cyberspace isn’t purely virtual.  
It comprises the computers that store data plus the systems and infrastructure that allow it to 
flow.” 242  Essentially, cyberspace encompasses the global communications domain, which 
includes fiber optics, open/closed computer networks, cellular, various space-based 
communications, and the Internet.    
 Four common themes have emerged in research and have been validated by many 
other researchers.243  First, hackers will always find a way to exploit new software and 
hardware. 244  Second, a basic malware exists and variants are created off that baseline.245  
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Third, this cyber threat is persistent and little investment can yield large returns.246  Fourth, 
human error is inevitable.247 The conditions for a double-cross or reversal of a cyber-attack 
operation must involve three phases: 
 Deception; you have to invent or design a new network, or build off an existing 
network, with the purposes of luring and enticing a cyber actor intending on doing 
something malicious to visit and follow through.248249 
 Detection; the indication of a CNE activity occurring or attempt to deceive the 
network sensor or individual receiving emails with malicious attachments.250251 
 Reversal/double-cross; once the identification of the attack and tools used to 
perform the exfiltration of the data, the defender designs tailored tools to reverse the 
operation to playback the prepared material to entice the tasking element of the 
attacker to increase the frequency and steer the intruder’s attacks.252   
How Cyber-Attackers Attack 
Cyber attackers have a cycle of operations, which are deliberate activities that require 
deep analysis when attempting to reverse them upon the attacker, and there are potential 
indications and warnings of an actor preparing to conduct an operation against a network.  
This is crucial because SCIO’s success depends on ensuring that the attacker’s confidence is 
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not shaken by any alarms sounded upon the initiation of the operation.  Everything must 
look like a typical attack the attacker has performed flawlessly without alarm before.    
Singer and Friedman have defined an advanced persistent threat (APT) as “a cyber-
attack campaign with specific, targeted objectives, conducted by a coordinated team of 
specialized experts, combining organization, intelligence, complexity, and patience.”253  The 
APT attack sequence is as follows: 
 
Figure 2. The APT Cycle of Operations 254 
Step 1. Intelligence Gathering- The APT is given its assignment, which is  
 
initiated by identifying and researching potential targets who have a connection to  
 
the assignment. Based on the research, the APT develops a target package, which  
 
includes a target history, Facebook information, and other connection information.   
 
Based on this information, the ATP develops a customized or tailored attack.   
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Step 2. Point of Entry: “The initial compromise is typically from a zero-day  
malware delivered via social engineering (email/instant messenger or  
downloadable file). A backdoor is created and the network can now be  
infiltrated.”255  
Step 3. Establishing Command Control and Communication: This is the act of 
directing the malware that was employed against the network to then compromise  
specific servers, personal computers, and applications for the purpose of exfiltrating the data 
of interest.    
Step 4. Lateral Movement:  “Once inside the network, attacker’s compromise  
additional machines to harvest individual user network credentials, escalate  
privilege levels within one’s network, unbeknownst to system administrators, and  
maintain control of one’s network. “256     
Step 5. Asset/Data Discovery:  “Several techniques exist that are used to identify the 
noteworthy servers and the services that house the data of interest.”   
Step 6. Data Exfiltration: “Once sensitive information is gathered, the data is  
funneled to an internal staging server where it is chunked, compressed and often  
encrypted for transmission to external locations under attacker’s control.” 257 
In most cases, the APT’s goal is to gain access to the targeted network without being 
detected, stay inside the network, exfiltrate undetected information, identify exploitable 
information about the network, and integrate the APT into the network command and 
control infrastructure.  In simple terms, they don’t want the target to know they are inside 
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the network.  The goal is to be unnoticed by network sensors, anti-virus programs, network 
defenders, and become part of the normal profile.  The only way to begin to form a solution 
is to manage the cyber actor and raise the costs upon our adversaries. Engaging in offensive 
counterintelligence operations in cyberspace appears to be a large part of the solution to 
managing the cyber actor and raising the costs of intrusion for adversaries and competitors.    
Literature Review 
DCS in WW2, Wireless Radio Set 
“The breaking of the Enigma, the German cipher machine, was the most importance intelligence triumph of 
this or any other war.”258 
 In Ben Macintyre’s “Double Cross”, readers learn how British intelligence broke the 
mathematical code to the Enigma.  The Enigma was the Germans’ method of encryption, 
aimed at protecting their method of communications with their enemy agents operating in 
England, Europe, and Africa; as well as the encryption method of the German foreign 
embassies.   With the ability to read the Germans’ communications, the UK gained an 
invaluable tool because it became possible to identify Abwehr agents operating on British 
soil.  MI-5, specifically the B-1A division CE quickly moved in to turn these agents to 
support the larger military objectives.  As Masterman outlined in his study, which can be 
considered the source document for the double-cross, MI-5 and MI-6 then had three major 
elements to mount a successful deception: the ability to read the Germans’ secret 
communications; control of the secret communication operators and handsets; and 
knowledge of German global espionage operations.  The result was, as MacIntyre describes, 
that “the misinformation that the first compromised agent sent back to his handler was 
tracked through the Abwehr network and provided the key for the decryption of their 
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modified cyber.”259 This ripple effect meant that “once the codes were cracked, MI-5 knew 
all of the operational agents within Great Britain and could uncover what the Abwehr did 
and did not know about the Allied war effort.”260  Manipulation of the wireless radio 
transmitter as a medium to pass true information and misinformation proved to be 
extremely effective, and the result was the success of D-Day.     
Contemporary Literature on Offensive and Defensive Cyber Counterintelligence 
 
Cyber anything is relatively a new topic and not able to be neatly organized. 
Offensive cyber counterintelligence (OCCI) can be defined as “interactions with the 
adversary to directly collect information about their intelligence collection operations or to 
deceive them.”261  The offensive action can be done from within a network or externally.   
CCI would employ all the traditional CE techniques.  For example, “an Offensive CCI 
operation could be run to identify or mitigate adversaries already in your network” or “help 
create a honeypot inside your network to identify malicious actors on the network.”262  
Defensive cyber counterintelligence (DCCI) is described as those “actions taken to identify 
and counter adversary intrusions before they occur as well as the efforts in identifying and 
minimizing the threat landscape.”263  The analysis is usually intertwined with all source 
intelligence that evaluates the network internally, looking for gaps and weaknesses that 
intruders can exploit, and working to bolster its defenses.264   
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Through its analysis of the threat, DCCI determines the adversary’s likely 
information interests when the network is compromised, and the server (honeypot) storing 
the documents is configured with tracking tools embedded with malicious code that is not 
easily detectable, as well as providing bait information that leaves the intruder desiring 
more.265  Deception in cyberspace enters the discussion with the use of “fake or incorrect 
data,” with the thought process being that “the adversary would retrieve files with the fake 
information, possibly corporate intellectual property such as a secret recipe, believing it to be 
real.”266  One challenge that accompanies with this concept is that “organizations struggle to 
effectively perform proper architecture and maintenance of their systems as well as the 
proper acquisition and use of traditional defense systems let alone the establishment of 
advanced systems.”267  The other challenge is that a target of the cyber threat would have to 
agree to sacrifice some material of value to the target.  
Roles in Deception, Counter-deception, and Attribution in Cyberspace 
“Confusing and fooling the enemy has allowed many and under-manned and out-gunned commander to win a 
decisive victory or an asymmetric force to win at a lower cost and risk.”268 
This section outlines the roles in cyberspace that are crucial to framing the problem, 
the phases, and levels of deception an actor must achieve to effectively launch SCIOs 
through this medium.  In “A Tricky Situation: Deception in Cyberspace”, Neil MacEwan 
focused on the art of deception employed against the weakest link in the computer security 
chain: the network user, citing several examples with nexuses to US based criminal activities 
and internationally-based activities.   The primary tactic of these criminal actors is the 
employment of sophisticated social engineering scenarios. MacEwan described social 
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engineering as “the latch lifting in trickery”, and once the latch to the gate is lifted, the sky is 
the limit.269 He concluded that deception employed against a person is a primary component, 
upon which the development of more sophisticated social engineering scenarios will 
increase, and one can assume that after the fact, more people will assist in “lifting the 
latch”.270   
“Deception on behalf of the cyber attacker” is little different than a case officer 
approaching a target posing as someone else, better known as a false flag.   What has been 
seen is that the tactics, techniques, and procedures are essentially the same in both criminal 
and nation or state-sponsored cyberattack activities.  Attribution is extremely difficult, as 
attackers enjoy their anonymity and employ deceptive techniques designed to keep the 
defenders continually guessing.271   
 “Counter-deception on behalf of the defender” is much like a security service officer 
waiting for indications from a technical or human intelligence source that a penetration 
exists.  However, the defender has to deceive the human asset assisting with cyber targeting, 
if applicable, and determine if other vulnerabilities exist.  The defender must gain deep 
knowledge of the intruder: who they really are, what they want, when they will attack, where 
will they likely attack, why they are attacking, and how the defender can alter or reverse the 
attack to the benefit of the home network.      
“Attribution” has three goals in cyber defense. First is the tactical goal to determine 
how the attacker compromised the network and what they wanted. Second is the strategic 
goal that focuses on identifying the attacker and its goals, and finally there is the aspect of 
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communicating the results of the investigation.272  In 1981, the US intelligence community 
was able to achieve attribution in cyberspace when it learned that the KGB was illegally 
acquiring various US technologies that could aid Soviet commercial and industrial areas of 
business (economic espionage).  The US tampered with software that would control the 
regulation of natural gas flowing through a pipeline and allowed the KGB to steal the 
software, which had a Trojan horse embedded.  Attribution came in the form of a 3-kiloton 
explosion inside Russia that destabilized the Soviet’s ambition to be a principal provider of 
natural gas to Eastern and Central Europe.273  
Deceptive Concepts of Operation in Cyberspace-Incubation/Illumination 
Operations 
 
 Contemporary deception technologies designed to deceive the APT into  
believing it has compromised its target is essential to the tactical success of SCIOs.  
Incubation and illumination operations have been demonstrated to reverse the APT’s CNE 
and allow the defender to insert specially prepared data to impose a cost upon the attacker 
and illuminate their path of exfiltration, which leads to increasing the success of attribution. 
The uniqueness of this concept is that it also allows the defender to analyze the attacker’s 
tools within a controlled environment, facilitating the exploitation of the tool’s signatures to 
improve existing network sensors.       
As Kyle Wilhoit explained, “malware incubators allow a researcher to execute 
malware in what appears to an attacker to be their targeted environment.”274  In other words, 
if a network’s intrusion detection system is able to steer an attacker into an environment that 
mimics the intended target environment, it is a success.  The incubators can mimic these 
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characteristics of the network: whatever scaled network environment, host naming 
conventions, operating systems and system vulnerabilities are based on the software out at 
the time; other private network connections; and the installment of decoy documents.275  
Decoy documents are designed to entice the cyber actor to extract them from the network, 
and can be embedded with beacons, malware, and other additional tools designed to exploit 
the path of extraction.276  The lifecycle of incubation reveals a series of stages:  
 Preparation: occurs when the first signs of malware are introduced into the network, 
application, or mimicked cyber environment.  Identifies the target of the malware 
(operating system, documents, data, and specific information) and additional details 
about who is behind the attack. 
 Incubation: this is the phase where things get “warmed up” and the manipulated 
information is prepared for identification by the attacker and then packaged for 
exfiltration.  It also allows for full forensic review of the malware, which can aid in 
creating other opportunities for global detection of the same actor elsewhere. 
 Illumination: a phase that helps assess the damage of the attacker, potentially 
identifying the motivation and intended customer of the exfiltrated data.    
 Verification: the difference between the concept of operations development and this 
notion is that the development of “incubation” during the verification phase goes 
offensive to “poke” attackers with salted documents that are designed to hatch inside 
the attacker’s network.277 
                                                        
275 ibid. 
276 Brian M. Bowen, Shlomo Hershkop, Angelos D. Keromytis, and Salvatore J. Stolfo. "Baiting Inside 
Attackers using Decoy Documents," in Security and Privacy in Communication Networks, SecureComm 2009. edited 
by Yan Chen, Tassos D. Dimitriou and Jianying Zhou J. Lecture Notes of the Institute for Computer Sciences, 
Social Informatics and Telecommunications Engineering, vol. 19. (Berlin: Springer, 2008), 51-70.  
277 Kyle Wilhoit, “T318 Chicken of the APT Understanding Targeted Attackers with Incubation” (presentation, 
Derbycon 4, 2014). Accessed April 9, 2017, https://archive.org/details/derbycon4.  
78 
 
Kyle Wilhoit initially began to demonstrate the concept of incubation by building a 
network environment that mimicked a utility company, replicating the network of a 
municipal water system by using specialized software and real industrial controllers. From 
the internet, it looked like a water plant in Ashburn, VA. 278  The results were eye opening.  
Within a couple of weeks, the attacker “stole passwords, engineering PDFs and data that 
would let them back into the computers through a remote access system for employees”,279 
so that they could return at any time and access the network.  This concept will work in the 
US’s favor because the United States is so highly sought after by cyber 
adversaries/competitors, particularly when it comes to theft of technology research and 
development information.   
In 2014, Threat Stream, a subsidiary company of Google, conducted a study with 
another “decoy” system that was designed to look like another “industrial control computer” 
and entice hackers in an effort to determine what country was the most heavily targeted by 
cyber actors.  The study replicated the decoy network to make it appear that it was located in 
U.K., U.S., Amsterdam, Tokyo, Brazil, and Singapore”.280  “Over a three-month period, the 
US was by far the biggest source of attack traffic (more than 6000 attacks), followed by 
China (more than 3500), Russia (more than 2500), the Netherlands and France.”281  
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Figure 3. Country-based Count of Online Attacks on Decoy Computers 282 
 The current US defense strategy is to build resilience in its current systems and 
employ an in-depth defense strategy.  However, as research has shown, attackers approach a 
network from a specific angle, expecting the network to have in depth security and defense 
strategies.  With that said the in-depth defense strategy is also among the most difficult 
network security solutions to maintain and clean up following a network compromise.  
Based on a review of the information, to date, nothing has addressed the 2013 Defense 
Science Board’s Report call to “decrease a would-be attacker’s confidence in the 
effectiveness of their capabilities to compromise DoD systems.”283    
 In terms of decreasing the confidence of would-be attackers, two steps must be 
taken. First, one has to impose a cost for engaging in the determined illegal activity.  Second, 
the cost must be great enough to reduce the confidence the actor has in who they tasked to 
carry out the CNE.  However, the cost cannot be immediately felt, the objective is to induce 
the adversary into acting on behalf of the illegally transferred data.      
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Creating a network through decoys, honeypots, and incubators employs deception. 
All of these factors are essential when attempting to get the hacker to believe that he or she 
has penetrated the target network’s defenses.   CE techniques, used by passing intended 
information through the controlled network environment, are also incorporated.  However, 
depending on the actor and the specific target in mind (document, network, and person), CE 
techniques through physical controlled or double agent operations would improve the 
credibility of the documents or network environment.   Using salted documents would aid in 
the attribution and exploitation of the hacker, allowing the recipient of the hack to covertly 
follow the theft of the documents.    
 From this literature review, we see that SCIOs in cyberspace can strategically assist 
the US government in enhancing, amplifying, and inflicting technological or military 
surprise.  This was found through adversary and US initiated operations.  They can be used 
to identify what is really worth protecting based on your adversary information needs to a 
source, protecting the elements that are truly unknown, and enhancing or amplifying its 
capabilities through the conditioning of the analytical and cyber environment of the 
adversary by ensuring the confidence in their clandestine sources of information.  However, 
while OCOs show much promise, limitations exist.  As we saw with Stuxnet, such activities 
can also give one’s adversary a jump-start to its own OCO program.    
 In closing, adversary cyber investments yield maximum returns.  Second, attribution 
is very hard to carry out.   Third, US cyber policy has yet to effectively address protection of 
intellectual property, research and development, and other national security information.  
Another option has to be found outside of the traditional concepts put forward and borne 
out of a Cold War mentality, especially in times when economies are entangled and positions 
of power are being challenged.  Taking advantage of one’s adversaries’ covert exfiltration 
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channels to steal sensitive US proprietary information is probably one of the greatest 
advantages of the United States.  Regardless of the cyber attacker’s identity (state or non-
state actor), it is clear that in terms of tactics, techniques, and procedures, attackers study 
their target and adjust the attack based on what they have learned or have been given, with 
the goal being to infiltrate the network and exploit the target covertly.   SCIOs reverse the 
hacker’s TTP to become the advantage of the SCIO initiator.    
Deception in Cyberspace-Decoy Operations 
“The focus of this dissertation is on a defense system of an offensive nature, intended to confuse and deceive 
adversaries by leveraging uncertainty, to reduce the knowledge they ordinarily have to target systems, or they 
may be used to provide false information to an adversary that causes a detectable reaction.”284  
 
In 2011, Brian Bowen used his PhD thesis to make the following point about using 
network and host decoys to detect malicious actions by hackers or malware and educating 
users on potentially vulnerable actions:  “although the threats and adversaries may vary, in 
each context where a system is threatened, decoys can be used to deny critical information to 
adversaries, making it harder for them to achieve their target goal.”285 The purpose of 
Bowen’s thesis was to lay out “a design for host and network deception infrastructure”,286 
and the framework was tested successfully.  The plan of the operation was to survey the 
threat landscape facing the potential target and design a system enabling seamless network 
generation and host decoys to fool the attacker.287  Three principal factors were tested, using 
a wide variation of potential attackers: the “believability of the generated decoy”; “their 
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ability to detect attackers”; and the accurate measurement of the target’s network to ensure 
that scalability is tailored for the activity.288   
As Bowen declares, his research made the following contributions: 289 
 A novel set of generally applicable properties are proposed to guide the 
design and deployment of decoys and maximize the deception they induce 
for difference insiders who vary by their level of knowledge and 
sophistication. 
 A large-scale automated creation and management system for deploying 
decoys that can indicate malicious insider activity.  This provides a means 
for ordinary users to deploy decoy documents without having to setup 
sophisticated honeypot systems and sensors. 
 The use of decoys properties to measure the success of the proposed decoy 
systems.  In particular, we focus on the two most important properties of 
decoys – believability and detectability – for metrics on which the systems 
are evaluated. 
 A novel architecture based on a ‘record, modify, replay’ paradigm to 
automatically generate large quantities of decoy traffic that are injected into 
the network.  The system continuously regenerates decoys to prevent an 
adversary from learning how to recognize bait over time. We analyze the 
believability of the generated traffic with human judges and present results 
from field experiments. We provide a statistical analysis to show the 
believability of the traffic when automated tools are used. 
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 A novel approach for malware detection that relies on the use of decoy 
injection where by bogus information is used to bait and delude information 
stealing malware, forcing it to reveal itself during the exfiltration or 
exploitation of the monitored information.  We demonstrate the believability 
of the simulations experimentally with human judges and statistical means. 
We show malware can be detected with various types of web and financial 
decoys. 
 A novel approach to measuring an organization's security posture using 
decoys that demonstrates an expanded role of decoys for providing utility in 
measuring security and trapping user mistakes for educational purposes. 
Principal Test Area Results 
Automatic Generation of Decoy Results: This specific contribution, when tested, 
determined that normal users outside of specific US government networks could design 
decoy systems that can detect inside user malicious activities. As a result, it reduced the 
reliance on sophisticated honeypot systems.  
Decoy Networking Results:  The system developed by Bowen was able to automatically 
generate decoys that were believable, and it was difficult to determine what documents were 
real and which were not.   Using human test subjects to identify the real documents resulted 
in “only 49% accuracy on average, equivalent to random guessing.”290  Bowen’s test also 
proved that the system design, which was used on a real wireless network, was able to detect 
surveillance and exploitation of the network that was being tested.291   
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Decoy Host System Results:  Bowen and his team created an application called 
“BotSwindler” for “a bait injection system designed to delude and detect crimeware causing 
it to reveal itself during exploitation of monitored decoy information.”292  Using the “Turing 
Test” and BotSwindler, Bowen’s team successfully convinced humans of the veracity of their 
simulations “about 46% of the time.”293  One of the ripple effects of the technology is 
BotSwindler’s ability to steal the attacker’s malware, which could be used for network sensor 
pattern identification and intrusion detection.    
Security Metrics Results:  The use of decoys was introduced as an educational tool to 
assist network use and measure the organization’s security posture with the aim that “users 
can be trained using decoy technology to be cognizant of potential threats.”294  The potential 
for educating users on networks to detect cyber-attacks or deception shows promise, as the 
better educated a user, the greater the capability to detect network compromises.  This is a 
continuously sought after objective by the DoD and private sector.    
Analysis of the Data and Application to Thesis Concept 
Decoy Networks 
Bowen’s analysis proves multiple points. For the purposes of this thesis, it is important to 
note the following: 
 Decoy systems work by exploiting the attacker without the attacker’s knowledge. 
The decoy system also helps to ferret out insiders who are clandestinely providing 
information to adversarial entities. 
 Results indicate that the believability of documents can be enhanced through inside 
information, which opens the door to manipulating the information in order to get 
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an adversary to act on the false intelligence.  Previous experience has shown that the 
adversary wants verification when provided with manipulated information. 
Therefore, if one engages in an SCIO using a physical person and a controlled 
network, and employs as a double agent (deliberately passing information from a 
target and amplifying and validating the information), this minimizes the chances of 
a deception operation being detected by the initiator of the attack. 
Bowen’s theory also has some limiting factors: 
 Bowen acknowledges that the technical capabilities show promise, but their 
development is yet immature,295 and both the scale of the network and the 
technology to manipulate the attackers’ malware need additional enhancements.   
Other concepts and technology could be combined in order to increase the technical 
capabilities of BotSwindler.  For example, another security researcher, Kyle Wilhoit, 
developed a similar process called “illumination operations”, which was designed 
specifically to reverse the attacker’s malware and exploit the attacker’s cyber 
infrastructure.296 This technique is similar to Bowen’s, but uses cyber incubators, 
which mimic the cyber environment that the adversary was attempting to penetrate.  
The incubators trick the malware into hatching, which allows the defenders to study 
that attack in progress.     
 Due to the immaturity of the technology and the testing process set up to determine 
the skill of the attacker, no assessment of the attack was conducted after the intruder 
had entered the network.  The attacker was assessed through the credibility of 
documents, meaning the document had to have substance and contain information 
that actually interested the actor.  If a bottom-up testing process were to be 
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developed with the integration of other technology, the chances the owner of the 
targeted network controlling the outcomes of an intrusion would be markedly 
improved.   
 
 
Illumination Operations  
Wilhoit extends Bowen’s concept by creating a network environment that the APT can 
penetrate. The illumination process involves creating a network that operates in parallel to 
the APT targeted network.  The creation of this “sandboxed” environment allows the 
network defenders to thoroughly monitor the APT’s malware, thus enabling live study of the 
tools being employed against the network, what the intruder is searching for, and its 
communications plan.   
 This process allows for the defender to manipulate the malware, and the 
manipulated data creates an opportunity for the defender to exploit the intruder 
through the manipulated data the APT is focused on stealing.  The technical 
manipulation of the malware transforms the APT’s malware into a Trojan horse to 
the initiating APT, accessible to the defender at any time.   This in effect would 
create a reversal of APT CNE operations, enabling the defender to not only control 
the manipulated data the APT is stealing, but also to use the homing technology to 
monitor internal and external malware movements, enhancing and bolstering 




SCIO operations are modeled after the double-cross system and can be initiated 
through various means (human, technical, cyber) in order to enhance and amplify the 
strategic defense objectives of the United States.   
Question:  Are SCIOs possible in cyber-space, and is it technically feasible to reverse 
Computer Network Exploitations (CNE)? Are SCIOs a viable option to increasing the cost 
and risk of states, organization, and groups who attempt to exploit stolen US Government 
data? Can this be achieved with existing capabilities and techniques? 
Answers: First, SCIOs are possible in cyber-space and commercial market trends, as 
seen by the use of intelligent deception techniques by  US health care and IT companies in 
particular.  The commercial market movement towards this technique indicates that 
deceptive networks are being used to reverse APT CNE and learn from their attacks to 
bolster cyber defenses.297  Second, the question should have probably been phrased 
differently: are SCIOs in cyber-space a viable option to increasing cost and risk of states, 
organization, and groups who attempt to exploit US Government data?  Based on current 
US cyber strategy, it appears these techniques are gaining traction within the commercial 
space; meanwhile the Department of Defense is focusing energies in other areas of network 
defense and shaping policies to affect the global non-governed cyber environment.   So the 
answer to the question is “It depends.”   For SCIOs to be a viable option in cyberspace, the 
US must invest in basic science gains that benefit the US economy, along with defense 
research and development that feed commercial solutions. The US government must also 
understand that a majority or the information/data these actors pursue is outside the US 
government network domain.  Based on current APT CNE data, it appears that as a whole, 
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the APTs are a vacuum for US data.  They break in, harvest the information, and then stay 
behind to establish an ability to remotely access the network at a later time.298 However, 
through the review of the recently developed concepts of illumination operations (Wilhoit) 
and systems operations (Bowen), it was shown that a great deal of work is required in ahead 
of time to prepare the data and network to look plausible and scaling the network properly is 
very timely.   
The need for plausibility is an element that has not been fully analyzed within this 
body of research. The network preparation and material have to be believable in order for 
the sale of the APT’s CNE operation to be successful.  However, increasing the believability 
of the operation depends on the material that has been placed on the decoy system for the 
cyber actor to exfiltrate.299  Tactically, the defender has to deceive the APT into believing it 
has infiltrated its network defenses, so the internal network design has to be legitimate, and 
the defender has to ensure the APT remains unaware that it has been detected.    
The strategic aspect is the quick reversal and feed of material to the APT to ensure 
they think their CNE is secure and successful.  The APT must believe the material is genuine 
and is what they have been tasked to steal, and the material must be believable enough to 
entice the APT to continue to come back.  One flaw was found in this approach: without the 
human element, the operation could be compromised from the start.   Using a trusted 
insider or someone with knowledge to feed the APT targeting information to attack the 
network in the manner or means necessary to be exploited in the front end increases the 
likelihood the operation and material will strategically impose a cost that is beneficial to the 
US.     
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This technique poses challenges, as knowingly giving up legitimate secrets or 
commercial research and development has not been visited legally or reviewed against 
current US policy.   The technology to engage in effective cyber security deceptions exists 
today in the form of illumination operations, incubation, and decoy systems.  However, what 
is lacking is a robust system to synergize defensive and offensive CI activities.  SCIO is a 
hybrid contemporary definition for the famed British Double-Cross system.        
Hypothesis: A cyber SCIO using a contemporary network environment would be little 
different than what the British employed during World War II.  The computer and network 
are the new wireless radio set and selected transmission system for already recruited double 
agents or agents waiting for adversarial recruitment and employment. SCIOs are technically 
feasible based on tested and approved research, thus representing a viable option to 
increasing the costs and risk of states, organizations, and groups who exploit US government 
data. Historical research leads to a conclusion that when integrated with physical agents, 
SCIOs in cyberspace will effectively increase the believability of the data provided from both 
channels of clandestine communication, thus creating opportunities to elicit a response 
favorable to the initiator or defender.  However, the scalability and capacity to conduct large-




     CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
“To Marshall and his associates, the lessons were clear.  The side that recognized and exploited such advances 
gained not just an edge in warfare but an overwhelming advantage; for the side that missed the chance, the 
consequences could be fatal.”300 
Summary of findings 
The defining and shaping of strategic counterintelligence was conducted through the 
research and study of historical counterintelligence operations.  These operations employed 
military, diplomatic, and industrial establishments, using them as channels of information to 
deliberately manage an adversary’s clandestine intelligence collection operation.  The 
methods of information transmitted through the adversary’s clandestine intelligence 
collection operation incorporated the use of humans—both witting and unwitting, technical 
penetrations, and wireless interceptions.    
The cyber domain is the main domain of the contemporary world. There is a 
continuous flow of new hackers and programmers, leaving the US security establishment in 
no short supply of work.   These are the current assumptions: 
 Violent Non-State Actors (VNSAs) are engaging in offensive and passive 
intelligence operations aimed at protecting their networks, illicit finances, and 
communications.  
  VNSAs and Violent State Actors (VSAs) are adopting hybrid warfare as a military 
strategy.  That poses a direct threat to the US and will challenge its intelligence 
community, which is responsible for providing indications and warnings.  
 VSAs that engage in cyber-espionage challenge the US’s economic security, and 
there is no end in sight. The US needs a left-of boom like approach, placing great 
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emphasis on multi-modal cost imposition strategies to deter non-state actors, and 
VNSAs.  The goal is to drive the target’s moves, not wait for them and react. 
Key Findings 
 Chapter 2, “Can Violent Non-State Actors deceive a State and Can States Deceive a 
Violent Non-State Actor (VNSA)?” explored the use of strategic counterintelligence and 
operational concepts derived from historical case studies, presenting information 
through successful and unsuccessful attempts made by both a non-state actor and state 
actor.  The results demonstrated that VNSAs could effectively deceive state intelligence 
services, and state intelligence services also effectively deceived VNSAs, showing that 
running coordinated double-cross like operations is extremely effective at deceiving the 
target, especially for the purposes of a larger objective.  The predominant theme of 
significant concern is the VNSA’s ability to run sophisticated double-cross like 
operations against highly competent state intelligence services.  The ability for a VNSA 
to deceive a state actor has been done with great success, especially in terms of 
influencing state actor’s leadership.  Actors like Hezbollah deserve the most attention 
and focus, and allied services should work hard to destabilize them.  
 Chapter 3, “Employment of U.S. Controlled Technology Transfer to Aid U.S. Cost 
Imposition Strategies”, explored whether an SCIO initiated by the state (US) is an 
effective method to deliver a cost imposition strategy.  The selected examples prove that 
SCIOs, as defined in this research, can be effective against a state actor, and the costs 
they impose meet the criteria for SCIOs to be a strategic instrument or platform to 
impose a cost on adversary.  The research reveals that the US previously engaged in 
clandestine operations to counter Cold War adversaries attempting to acquire US 
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restricted technologies, yet the US has also been victim to state adversary CE operations 
that have triggered US defense investments based on deceptive information. 
Chapter 4, “Double-Crossing the Computer Network Exploitation (CNE) through 
the Deception of the Advanced Persistent Threat (APT)”, assessed whether SCIOs are 
effective in cyberspace and if they can be successfully developed.  The results point to a high 
likelihood (pending technical feasibility) that double-crossing APTs is feasible.  The 
traditional medium was the wireless radio set that was used to transmit information 
clandestinely and handled by a controlled asset on the end of the handset.301   We saw that 
the cyber environment is a particularly conducive medium for double cross operations.   A 
cyber SCIO using a network would be little different, except for the new wireless radio set. 
Most importantly, already recruited double agents are waiting for adversarial recruitment 
approaches.     
In conclusion, Chapter 5 provides: a) Counterintelligence Net Assessment and b) Research 
Contributions to US Defense and Security Studies.   
Counterintelligence Net Assessment: Shaping of US Strategic CI 
“Any intelligent fool can make things bigger and more complex.  It takes a touch of genius – and a lot of 
courage – to move in the opposite direction” 302  
- Albert Einstein 
Andrew Marshall, Director of the Pentagon’s internal think tank, who conceived the 
concept of during the Cold War, led the famed Office of Net Assessment. The Office of 
Net Assessment’s purpose was to provide an alternative to traditional analysis, which forces 
the Department of Defense to assess its adversary using “a method of broad analysis 
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normally characterized by simultaneously focusing on two or more competitors or 
opponents through a comparative process.”303 
One of the primary analytical points of a net assessment is the synthesis of red 
(adversary) and blue (friendly) strategy into a single place.304  A Strategic Counterintelligence 
Net Assessment should be implemented to review/analyze these sets of broad items: 
 Define the political, defense, and future context for analyzing the problems. What is 
the current and future security environment?  Using system-initiated operations, can 
the challenges we face now and in the future be shaped to advance US national 
security objectives or tools? 
 Identify the trends of reporting coming out of political, defense, academic, and 
industrial channels of information.   
 Can asymmetries be found that can be employed to exploit a gap and gain a 
competitive edge? 
 Assess foreign perceptions/world views, seek them out, and use them to acquire an 
advantage. 
 Outlining of go-it-alone or allied scenarios. 
 Assessment of balance: Can the US do this based on current policies and 
international agreements? Can it use a proxy to employ the strategy?  
 Introduction of game theory and modeling with current and future capabilities 
passed through a double-cross like system to an adversary: This should be mindful of 
understanding how the adversary will be shaped. There should also be development 
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of SCIO equations specific to affect US military outcomes by increasing the effect of 
surprise.305   
 Review of US foreign intelligence and offensive counterintelligence operations to 
assess returns on operational investments:  An example would be utilizing the Cuban 
initiated double agent operations launched against the CIA, which compromised US 
clandestine agent covert communications not only in Cuba, but within countries that 
fell within the USSR. These should be compared to traditional foreign intelligence 
operations in order to determine similarities and differences.    
The conclusion should enable a strong understanding of how US strategic 
counterintelligence should be developed, as well as current capabilities, such as the capacity 
to engage multiple actors, and advantages/disadvantages of US strategic counterintelligence.   
Research Contributions Specific to US Defense 
US Military Operations and Capabilities 
SCIOs employed to protect a sensitive capability, technology or operational response 
plan have a high likelihood of increasing the impact of surprise when engaging an 
adversary/challenger.   Much like Russia’s military doctrine of reflexive control, which relies 
on covert influence, cyber espionage, and sabotage operations, SCIOs are a highly effective 
response to covertly compromising countries that employ reflexive control like doctrines.  
As this research revealed through a review of reflexive control and hybrid warfare literature, 
many techniques rely on the same principles: exploiting an adversary through asymmetric 
operations, the use of transnational criminal organizations, proxy use, and a focus on 
breaking the will of the target so the initiator gets a desired pre-planned outcome.    
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SCIOs, within this context, take the US’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses and turn 
them into a strength that can further US military operations and capabilities by providing the 
adversary/challenger with corroborated true information. When analyzed, they provide 
policy prescriptions to the adversary/challenger’s leadership decisions calculus.  In effect, 
SCIOs deliver a cost to the adversary challenger engaging in espionage through the 
controlled release of specific technologies that the adversary/challengers desire to learn 
about. SCIOs then compromise the adversary/challenger through physical/cyber double-
agent operations that prove the benefits of the information provided to the 
adversary/challenger intelligence entity.   The other cost levied on the adversary/challenger 
is that through this SCIO process, adversary/challenger espionage activities will be 
compromised through CE tradecraft.306 
The introduction of cyber to SCIOs only enhances the effectiveness of the SCIO 
and its objectives.   The use of decoy systems has real promise for current cyber-attack 
threats. Decoy-based malware can be used to further exploit the attacker’s covert 
communications system, and decoy systems can harvest information and begin to shine the 
light on the proverbial “who ordered the attack” attribution problem.307  
This research combined multiple concepts to define strategic counterintelligence and 
what its operations should look like.  It frames the concept of strategic counterintelligence as 
having a direct impact on: 
 Research and technology protection programs integrated into defense oriented 
advanced research agencies, program offices, and command war planning 
protection schemes.  Although defensive, the operational activities produce 
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opportunities to enhance the system, technology, activity, and plan they are 
meant to protect.   
 Protection of US critical defense, commercial, and civil infrastructure. 
 Compromising VNSA operations and infrastructure for US or allied 
exploitation. 
 Defeating foreign denial and deception operations and engaging 
adversary/challenger doctrine. 
 Protecting US economic security and imposing a cost upon actors engaged in 
economic espionage activities. 
 Providing uninfluenced information to National Security Council and Defense 
leadership, reducing the chances of decision-making directed by the adversary of 
challenger.    
 Reducing bureaucratic sole requirements of “each is responsible for its own 
house approach to counterintelligence”, and increasing the level of support to 
aide broader US requirements.308     
 Moving from traditional case driven approaches to system driven approaches, 
taking lessons learned from historically effective CI services, and establishing 
penetrations within the target before actively going to look for someone who 
has access to information that the US needs to acquire.    
In closing, this concept is not immature.  History has provided numerous examples of the 
successes and failures of these types of activities designed to enhance and further a nation’s 
strategy.  It is now time to operationalize them.      
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